Thank you for this very kind invitation, which honours me. We all know that the Council on Foreign Relations is the place to be for any international leader visiting New York! We all know also the quality of your bi partisan work and the huge influence it has both in the US and in the world.

We are living in difficult times, marked by the return of interstate wars that we thought were over, the proliferation of civil wars and the multiplication of tensions from the Sahel to the South China Sea, not to mention Sudan, Yemen and many other spots devastated by misery, strife and war. And in the face of all these situations, the capacity of external players to shape the course of events tends to decrease. This reality affects Europe, but also the United States.

Two examples come to my mind. First Ukraine: our role is absolutely crucial, but we cannot determine the final outcome. Second, the Middle East: we are unable to bring about even a ceasefire in Gaza or prevent the current extension of the Israeli-Iranian conflict to Lebanon. We need to help Lebanon to recover its full sovereignty.

European shaping power remains limited

Where does Europe stand in relation to a world in which what I will call our “shaping power” is declining, and where an increasing and powerful number of actors are trying to navigate and make their own way?

To answer this question, let me first recall what Europe is and how its relations with power have been built.

The first point, which is often misunderstood or misrepresented, is that the European project has historically been built against the idea of power. This is a fundamental point, which makes the idea of power a very new one in Europe.

Why so? Quite simply because the aim of the European project was to reduce the instinct for power that existed among Europeans, who had been at war with each other for centuries. In addition, in the European project, they found a way to replace the use of force with peace, exchange, cooperation and interdependence. In fact, you will note that the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, came a year after the Suez debacle, when France and Great Britain had to withdraw their forces under joint pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty deliberately left aside issues such as war, defence and security, either because most states wanted to retain their sovereignty in this area, or because most European states felt that their security was guaranteed by NATO in the first place, especially after the failure of the EDC (European Defence Community).

How where are trying to enter the fray of power politics

But this situation has become untenable. One way or another, Europe is now obliged to think of itself as a power. And this is new. We cannot afford to stay out of the fray of power politics.

Why? First and foremost, because we have realized that the economic interdependence on which our project was based is now being captured by political and geostrategic rivalries.  National security has deeply transformed economic policies. For example, it is no longer possible to plan the organisation of value chains in isolation from geopolitical constraints. We used to think that free trade would have been in itself a source of security. The weaponisation of interdependences leads us to think differently. And in this regard we are much more vulnerable than the United States because – for example on trade - our dependencies are broader than those of the US.  De-risking, including from China, is therefore much more difficult for us than for countries such as the US. Still, we are adjusting our policy instruments to the new context. We want a much better level playing field while at the same time protecting our strategic infrastructures from potentially harmful external takeovers.

Secondly, because as Europeans we realize that we have common threats to face and common interests to defend, and that we can do both much more successfully collectively than individually.  The EU works for member states as a power multiplier in all areas where our interests are fully aligned.  

Finally, because we also know that -while NATO remains fundamental to our common security- the United States may also have other priorities. We cannot afford asking ourselves every four years whether our security will continue to be guaranteed by NATO. For a long time, European strategic responsibility was seen as a zero sum game between EU Defence and NATO. This is fortunately no longer the case. Even within the US, many are asking the EU to do more for its security. And basically all European states are absolutely convinced of the necessity of increasing their military expenditure.

At the same time let me also say to an American audience that EU security is a huge asset for the US and not simply a liability or a cost. NATO is the alliance on which the global standing of the US is based. NATO makes the US a great power. Today, we have come to a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that Europe must do more. We need to do more and we have taken already this path - but we also need to do better and together, not an easy task. This why you cannot expect immediate or spectacular moves. The correction of the trajectory has started, but it will take time, especially at a time when public resources are seriously strained in many EU countries. In Europe and elsewhere in the world there is a competition for scarce resources.

Power is a matter of resources. But it is also a matter of resolve. And resolve is first and foremost the expression of an instinct: the instinct of power. The power instinct stems from a sense of danger, threat and fear. As long as the danger is not effective and the threat does not materialise, power remains more or less an abstract concept. But when you start feeling the heat, things change. You start thinking in terms of hard power only when you feel the heat, not before.

The idea of power is new to Europe

That is why the war in Ukraine has transformed Europe's relationship with power. For the first time since the Second World War, danger, threat and fear have materialised in an indisputable way. For the first time a state, Russia, has invaded a European country. And what is important is that the brutality of the Russian invasion helped to unite European perceptions of the threat, whereas until then the Russian threat - understandably - had not had the same meaning in Riga or Lisbon.

What has this war changed? Three things

First, the war in Ukraine has forced the EU to tackle upfront the issue of the use of force in Europe and the need to adjust to this new challenge.  We are very far from becoming a hard power, because we are not a super state with a unified military force and a common command centre. But we have ceased to believe in the sole virtue of soft power. We used to be a benevolent soft power and now we are a ‘semi-hard’ power in the making. A ‘semi-hard’ power and not a full-fledged one because the EU is not and will never be a super state. But a hard power in the making because we have the capacity to coerce our foes   directly or indirectly and to react to their coercion. Therefore, and for the first time, we granted substantial military aid to Ukraine in a very short span of time and at a level equivalent to that of the United States.

We have also decided to accept Ukraine's membership of the European Union, something that seemed unthinkable four years ago. And believe me, this is the best security we can provide to Ukraine. We are granting colossal economic support to Ukraine and to the countries of the EU that are taking in Ukrainian refugees.

We have drastically reduced our energy dependence on Moscow, despite the fact that they thought that this dependence would have prevented us from acting collectively. Will this be enough? Certainly not. Power can only be built up gradually, and not always in a linear fashion. However, despite the scale of our unwavering support for Ukraine, the Russo-Ukrainian war remains an asymmetrical one. Ukraine needs to win the war. Russia just needs to avoid losing it. Which means that the status quo may work in favour of Russia. Moscow has the means to sustain the war, because its resources are considerable, its human resources inexhaustible and its public opinion apathetic. So how will it all end? We do not know. Nevertheless, more than ever we need to step up our support for Ukraine, to enable it to establish a better balance of military, economic and strategic power with Russia. However, it is up to Ukraine to decide what is and is not acceptable. In addition, in this ordeal, the joint support of the United States and Europe is decisive.

Over the past year, we have had to face a second major challenge:  the war in Gaza, following the horrific massacres committed by Hamas on October 7. We all know the Israeli-Palestinian problem, a highly complex historical issue. And we all know that the only realistic and lasting solution to this conflict is the emergence of a Palestinian state alongside an Israeli state. There are two peoples on the same land. And that's not going to change.

On these principles, the views of EU member states are fully aligned. But when it comes to common decisions, the views held by the different members states differ sometimes profoundly. We are however one of the first providers of humanitarian aid to Gaza and by far the first provider of economic aid to the Palestinian Authority. We are also the first trade partner of Israel.

Today, we are still a long way from the prospect of two states, and perhaps further away than ever, since we are still seeking a ceasefire in Gaza.

Not only is a ceasefire far from being achieved, but is not even certain that it will happen, probably because the belligerents have no interest in it. Despite all the risks that prolonging the conflict would entail for the Palestinian civilian population and for the Israeli hostages still being held by Hamas.

However, we must not give up, not only on  a ceasefire, which the United States are  working hard to achieve with countries such as Egypt and Qatar, but also on imagining what we call ‘the Day after’ because, since Clausewitz, we have all known that war only makes sense if it has a political purpose.

Without a political solution, we will enter a never-ending spiral in which Gaza will resemble Somalia in the 1980s; the West Bank will resemble Gaza, while southern Lebanon and Northern Israel are becoming the new battlefield of the confrontation between Israel and Iran. With two major risks. The first is to jeopardize the normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations, notably between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, and postpone the normalisation with the Saudis. The second is an intensified war between Israel and Iran.  In this context, Lebanon needs to regain its sovereignty.

As you can imagine, I have only scratched the surface of the complexity of the issues we have to deal with.

Let me say one last word about Transatlantic relations.

Allies but not aligned

Overall, they are good; we share the same values and objectives.

Of course, we may have differences of opinion. However, that is perfectly normal. Europe needs the United States while the United States needs Europe. We are allies but not aligned

I also know that the United States has an interest in having a strong, sovereign Europe on its side. I once said that Europe's strategic autonomy would only make sense when the United States endorses it, not in order to distance themselves from us but, on the contrary, to strengthen us mutually.

In the current global context, we all need to avoid a form of revolt by the Global South against the West. We are witnessing the emergence of a new form of a tri-polarity, with the New West - which is now less a geographic concept than a geopolitical one. The new West  (the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, Korea and Australia) on one side; the New East (China, Russia and North Korea) on the other; and finally the Global South, which has taken the measure of the global tensions that exist and is seeking to benefit from them, sometimes with great ability. In this ordeal, the cooperation of United States and Europe is decisive. I believe that the United Nations General Assembly, for which we all gathered in New York, is the place where these differences are expressed.

 In conclusion, I would say that Europe has made significant progress on the path to power during the last years. But there are still huge obstacles in front of us in tackling global issues and mobilising new economic resources, to prevent the EU from a declining, in a world of intensified military confrontation, political assertiveness and technological competition.

*Text for the speech delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on September 27th 2024