It is a real pleasure to join you this afternoon in beautiful Colorado Springs at this important meeting.

Thank you to the Space Foundation for inviting the perspective from the European External Action Service. The EEAS, in short, is the European Union’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy arm. Think of it as a combined Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence at EU level.

At EEAS, I am responsible for the EU’s Peace, Security and Defence Policy. This is a broad portfolio which ranges from dealing with the EU’s 24 civilian and military operations, including military support to Ukraine, to strategic domains – cyber, hybrid, maritime, and of course, space.

Space is a key capability of and for the EU.

Beyond being an industrial powerhouse in the defence and aerospace domain, the EU owns and operates its own space infrastructure, from the Galileo satellite navigation fleet to earth observations and soon communications constellations [which my colleague from the Commission, Christoph Kautz will outline later this afternoon] and has its own geospatial intelligence agency.

In the wider security [architecture] [governance] of EU space affairs – my responsibilities focus on space security and operational decision-making.

As our dependence on space services increases significantly, so do orbital threats.

We regularly see strategic competitors holding or preparing to hold space assets at risk:

whether through covert operations, by developing capabilities to kinetically destroy or incapacitate space infrastructure on a large scale, or by directly targeting governments, institutions and industry that are part of our unique space ecosystem.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine only emphasised the vulnerability of our economies, societies, and defence forces to space threats.

Three key points

Allow me to share three points with you, focusing on space security and the EU’s role in ensuring it.

1. What is our strategy?
2. What do we do concretely to secure space?
3. And how do we work with our partners to for a stable and secure space domain?

(1) Our strategy

In the EU, we have seen a clear paradigm shift towards a stronger focus on security and defence. This certainly applies in the space domain and much beyond.

If you’re intrigued by this – I would suggest glancing at a document called The EU Strategic Compass, our guiding doctrine as a peace, security and defence actor – including in space.

Part of this shift was that for the first time, our 27 Member States mandated us to craft a dedicated Space Strategy for Security & Defence.

Fastforward to March last year – we presented our strategy and marked the EU’s recognition of space as a strategic domain – which has broad security, economic and industrial implications.

Naturally, this strategy was developed in close cooperation with our 27 Member States. I wish to acknowledge colleagues present here today from the different space commands in Europe and their governments, who contributed to the debate.

Why is this so important? Because while our MS maintain their sovereign prerogative in space security and defence we are seeing an evolution towards more cooperation in this area, and 27 Member States had begun developing a shared strategic culture for space security – this truly marks a paradigm shift.

So what does this mean in practice?

(2) What do we do concretely to respond to space threats?

• This strategy has our work cut out for us across several pillars but let me focus specifically on space threat response and awareness.
• Earlier this year, we had our intelligence branch formulate a classified Space Threat Landscape Analysis.
• This analysis draws on increased information-sharing EU Member States and was complemented by insights from our geospatial intelligence agency, the EU Satellite Centre.
• This strategic intelligence is instrumental in helping us understand the range of counter-space capabilities our competitors are developing and testing. Beyond the orbital environment, it helps us understand implications for our ground-based infrastructure, data links, and of course space industry, where our companies and technologies are at risk of being targeted by espionage or hostile takeovers.
• After strategic intelligence comes insights on operational level.
• For nearly a decade [since 2016], the EU has in place a Space Threat Response mechanism. Let me explain how it works:
• For critical security-related events, our dedicated 24/7 team assembles a crisis staff of experts, connecting our high-level political decision-makers, including the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief at EEAS, where I work, and Member States’ with the technical experts [from the European Space Programme Agency] who monitor the security, for instance, of our global satellite navigation system Galileo.
• We exercise this process yearly and just completed our space threat response exercise last month, where we simulated incidents across the range of counterspace, from cyber-attacks to kinetic manipulation which may affect our Galileo infrastructure.
• Most critically perhaps, we have begun to explore the potential activation of the EU mutual assistance clause [enshrined in the EU Treaties], in case a space related incident may amount to an armed aggression on the territory of one or several EU Member States.
• As a stakeholder in the chain of command of this space threat response mechanism and bearing in mind the cooperation between the EU and US on satellite navigation, it was a particular pleasure to visit the GPS control center at Schriever Space Force Base yesterday.
• In the area of Space Domain Awareness, we are in regular exchange with our Member States towards detection and characterisation of space security incidents, to support possible attribution and response.
• Last autumn for instance, this helped us understand and ultimately call out the DPRK for its use of ballistic missiles to launch a reconnaissance satellite.
• Of course, strategic messaging around space security and technical recovery are important – but we are also preparing to extend our toolbox with additional countermeasures, including sanctions.
• Another example is that our Treaties provide us with an EU mutual assistance clause which ensures EU solidarity and response in case of an armed attack. This important provision also covers space related incidents.

(3) Partnerships

• The EU has partnerships in its DNA. In our security and defence policy, we will always try to work in concert with partners.
• This is especially important in space security, which both lends itself to, and requires, cooperation – whether for shared strategic messaging, burden-sharing in capabilities, or exchanging data and expertise.
• The US is the EU’s most important strategic partner. Space is no exception. Our annual EU US Space Security Dialogues are now in their 13th iteration, allowing high-level and expert exchanges on key areas such as evolving threats, multilateral engagement, space situational awareness or cyber security in space.
• The EU also engages in dedicated space security dialogues with other likeminded partners such as Japan, and expanding our engagement with Australia, Canada, and South Korea, many represented here.
• Our neighbour in Brussels, NATO is an important partner for us across our security and defence policy, and remains the main security guarantor for most of our MS. As the EU owns and operates its own space capabilities and NATO declared space as an operational domain, we intensified our space talks further.
• Finally, we practice [proactive] space diplomacy, especially at multilateral level in the UN. It is crucial to open channels with the ‘less likeminded’ to avoid unintended escalation.
• The UN remains a key forum for the EU, and we need to continue, together with all, to forge pragmatic steps though a responsible behaviour approach towards strengthening international security and stability in space – with renewed attention and alert this spring in view of [potential nuclear weapons in space] [potential violations of important treaties].

Conclusion

Let me leave you with three thoughts:

1. The EU has been preparing for a more competitive and contested space environment, and we have undergone a fundamental transformation in this regard.
2. We are gearing up to operate in a world where rules-based order and multilateralism are in decline and where power projection – including in space, and including in fundamentally disruptive ways – is becoming more frequent.
3. Europe, as a technological, economic and normative power, is one of the world’s leading space actors with space assets that provide freely accessible services to billions of users in the world. This means we have a responsibility to defend and secure space. Peace, stability and mutual respect in space is a prerogative for our work for peace and stability on the ground. Thank you.