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Good morning.

Welcome to all.  And thank you for allowing me to open the annual conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies.

For more than 20 years, the Institute has played a crucial role - acting as a bridge between the world of ideas and the world of policy making. It needs to continue doing so, getting closer to the policy-making scene.

The annual conference of the Institute is a key moment on the calendar: when Europe’s strategic community comes together.

To assess the main security trends and threats we face. It is a chance to lift our eyes from constant crisis management and the ‘tyranny of the present’.

My day-to-day live reflects the ‘age of perma-crisis’:

This weekend’s dramatic events in Russia; the war against Ukraine; Serbia-Kosovo, the Sahel etc.

On top, we have the re-calibration of our China strategy, the Summit with Latin America etc..

And of course we have our security and defence agenda: the work on ammunition; industry, but also new missions etc. Next week, I will go to Niger to launch a new partnership mission there.

But today I want to go a bit beyond and do three things

1. Set out the main trends and forces shaping our world. To know what to do, you first need to understand and agree what is coming.

Here the headline summary is: we live in a world of power politics.

We did not want or chose this world, but it is a reality we have to face.

2. Underline that we need a broad approach to security.

Security is becoming increasingly multi-faceted.

Headline summary: we need to rethink what security means: use a wide prism and connect the dots.

3. Use the concept of economic security to illustrate all this.

You have seen the proposals made last week by myself as High Representative and the European Commission. And the topic is on the agenda for this week’s European Council.

Summary headline: we must avoid risky dependencies but so-called ‘de-risking’ is not without risks itself.

We must get the balance right: protect EU interests but also take into account how this will affect relations with key partners.

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THE NEW GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

Let’s start with what is happening – what dynamics and factors are shaping our world? 

In geopolitical terms we see a trend towards bipolarity coupled with ‘messy multipolarity’.

Geopolitical competition is weakening multilateralism like never before.

At the same time, US-China competition is becoming more confrontational and spreading to all areas: security, technology, ideology.

We see growing assertiveness and hedging behaviour by emerging countries.

The battle of narratives I talked about when the pandemic started is morphing into a battle of offers. Who can offer the most?

In security terms, we see both ‘old’ and ‘new wars’: brutal, high-intensity war on our doorstep and arms races world-wide.

In Europe, defence spending has gone up in recent rears, but in Asia it has risen even more. If people spend more on defence, that is because they feel insecure.

And at the same time: the rise in hybrid wars and the weaponisation of everything.

In geographic terms, the EU is surrounded by conflicts and insecurity: from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, Middle East, Caucasus, Western Balkans plus of course Ukraine, Moldova. 

In economic terms, we see a paradigm shift from the primacy of open markets to the primacy of security; from ‘just in time’ to ‘just in case’.

We know we have to take care more of the security of supply chains, as we learned in a brutal way during the start of the pandemic.

A growing role for the state, subsidies and industrial policies.

We also see growing competition over critical raw materials, esp those needed for the green transition.

Finally, on technology we see strategic competition over technological supremacy.

Technology is both a tool and an arena.

There is a lot more to say, but if you add all his up, two main conclusions emerge:

1. This is a competitive, power-political world.

In a world of giants, you need size and scale to survive and this why we have the EU. Europe must have the ambition to be a pole – and act as one.

2. We need to see the whole board; everything is connected. Security is a multi-dimensional concept.

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USING A BROAD SECURITY PRISM

This brings me to the second part of my remarks on why we need a broad security prism.

Security has multiple and new dimensions.

We see that the nature of war and security are changing.

If everything is weaponised, securitised and connected, we must frame our policies accordingly.

We need a broad prism and an integrated security approach.  

Together with the green and digital transitions, maybe this should be the ‘third transition’ for the EU?

In principle, we as EU have certain advantages. More than any other international player, we can cover the full spectrum of threats with a full spectrum of tools:

Diplomacy, civilian and military crisis management tools, financial and technical assistance, restrictive measures, regulatory powers, etc..

Of course, in practice, we often act in silos.

And the need for unanimity means we can be slow….  Sometimes, to circumvent the paralysis of unanimity of CFSP we now introduce proposals as trade policy, which of course is part of broader EU foreign policy.

Certainly, the war against Ukraine has accelerated our ability to think and act in geopolitical terms.  What I call our geo-political awakening.

I know this remains work in progress.

But this morning I want to mention some positive examples.

Take energy security.

In the space of 12 months, we have liberated ourselves from a toxic import dependence on Russian oil and gas that was built up over decades.

Nobody thought it was possible but we did it

Going from 40% of gas imports to almost zero.

Russia’s total energy revenues have been cut to half since 2022 and brought to below those of 2021.

With its weaponisation of energy, Russia shot itself in the foot.

It has destroyed its most important market and we have enhanced our strategic position.

There is no longer the need to ask ourselves when discussing Russia: ‘yeah, but what about our energy imports?’.

Going forward, we should avoid swapping one dependence for another.

But Russia’s energy leverage over us is gone for good.

Another example is our work on foreign interference and the manipulation of information.

It is a growing threat to our security and our democracies. This is not about controlling territory but the hearts and minds of people. It links the external and the internal; and we need a joined up ‘networked’ approach.

Not just with our member states, but also with international partners, civil society, the private sector etc,

And that’s what we have done.

A few years ago, there was nothing.

Since, we have built the EEAS Task Forces and the EU vs Disinfo campaign.

Last year the website had almost 3 million visitors.

Their social media channels reached another 20 million people, including in Russia.  

Since 2015, the team has exposed more than 15000 cases, backed by hard evidence, of Russia’s disinfo campaigns.

This is a tough, asymmetrical battle.

Our adversaries are ruthless and well-resourced. And lies spread faster than the truth.

It will take a marathon of resilience building, not a sprint.

But it is a battle we must win, with our international partners. This battle needs more resources.

There are more examples of progress that I could list:

• We are moving full speed ahead with the implementation of the Strategic Compass in all directions. This includes the first-ever EU live exercise; the vital work on industry and the organisation of the Schuman Forum to enhance our partnerships, just to mention a few points.

• The new global human rights sanctions regime enables us to go after human rights violators wherever they are.  

• Later this week, we will launch a new strategy on climate and security and defence which is all about identifying the growing security implications of the climate crisis and how we equip ourselves to handle them. Last week, we had an important event on this with Special Envoy Kerry, NATO Sec Gen Stoltenberg and my Commission colleague Timmermans. 

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ECONOMIC SECURITY AS EMBLEMATIC CASE

I could list other examples.

But I want to use the third and final part of my remarks to talk about economic security.

We need to discuss this and what it means, both the noun, ‘security’ which is crucal, and the adjective ‘security’ and the two together

The starting point has to be that open markets, economic integration and rules-based trade have been good for our prosperity.

They helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty world world-wide.

But clearly we are now in a new historical phase.

The time of “la mondialisation heureuse” is over.

The benefits of economic integration are being re-evaluated through the lens of national security.

Recently, we have seen how others, including adversaries, are using market-distorting techniques for political purposes.

And so in recent years, the EU has taken several measures to protect itself from security risks and excessive dependencies.

From the 5G toolkit to inward investment screening; from measures on procurement and subsidise to the anti-coercion instrument. Now we could possibly add outbound investment.

If you add it all up, it is quite a lot.

And yet, it is not enough as the landscape around us keeps changing.

This then is the backdrop for the new discussion on economic security.

And we, as foreign policy community, we have a big stake in this.

This is about security: about the use of economic tools to protect our security.

Yes, we must protect EU operators and citizens from economic risks and threats.

But we have to take care that when addressing these risks we do not unduly harm relations with third countries whose cooperation we continue to need.

Be aware of secondary effects and long-term consequences.

We do not want to fuel fragmentation in the world; splitting it into two blocs or eco-systems.

We have to look at how all this is seen by the rest of the world.

What it means for our credibility, for multilateralism. All of which remain essential.

For example, the term de-risking is central to this debate and rightly so. Who likes to run risks?

But de-risking is itself not without risks.

Cutting our energy imports from Russia and accelerating investment in renewables are good.

But they have increased our exposure to China which controls 80-90% of the refining and end-products needed for the green transition.

And it is not always easy to say objectively where de-risking ends and de-coupling begins.

So we need a real debate in Europe on this. Keeping in mind that the institutions can propose, but it is member states that decide.

It is not an easy debate, full of dilemmas

Protecting our broad security, while allowing freedom to flourish.

Fighting disinfo while safeguarding freedom of speech.

De-risking while remaining an open economy.

What is the right balance and where do you draw the line?

Colleagues,

Let me thank the Institute once again for all the work it is doing.

And all of you for being here

EU foreign policy is a collective exercise.

So, it is important that we, as strategic community, meet and discuss what we need to do.

And nobody offers a better platform to do this than the Institute.

I look forward to our debate.