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# **TEAM EUROPE**

# **Civil Society Dialogue**

# **in the Labour Sector**

**Report and Recommendations**

**Important:** *This report presents observations and recommendations from 50 representatives of trade unions and civil society organizations active in the labour sector, gathered at the Team Europe – Civil Society Dialogue in the Labour Sector in Dhaka, on 29 September 2024. The discussions focused on the following areas: freedom of association and labour law enforcement, social dialogue, and child labour and forced labour. The event was organised by the European Union Delegation in Dhaka, in cooperation with the Embassies of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. However, the views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official positions of these diplomatic missions.*

# 1

# FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND LABOUR LAW ENFORCEMENT

## DEFINITION OF WORKER

In Bangladesh, the definition of worker remains ambiguous and inadequate, weakening the legal foundation necessary to ensure fair representation and proper regulation of workers. **Women, migrants and vulnerable groups** are particularly heavily represented in informal sectors, yet they lack legal protection.

Currently, the labour laws create a divide by treating workers in **export-processing zones (EPZs)** differently from those in other sectors, fostering exploitation. Export processing zones have become "exploitation protection zones", where trade unions are prohibited, inspectors are barred from entry, and even government officials face obstacles accessing the zones. EPZ workers experience fundamental rights violations due to a **dual legal system**, with separate standards for EPZ and non-EPZ workers, with additional issues potentially arising in the special economic zones (SEZs).

The tragedies of the **Rana Plaza collapse** in 2013 and the **Tazreen factory fire** in 2012 exemplify the consequences of hiring **informal workers** without official contracts or identification. These workers became effectively "**unidentified**," making it difficult to track, identify victims, or ensure they received legal protection and compensation.

Finally, **middle management** face challenges too - their terms of employment are decided arbitrarily, they also often work long hours without overtime pay, face delayed salaries and are denied basic service benefits.

## Recommendations

- Amend the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA) to guarantee **protections for all workers**, including those in informal sectors, as mandated by the Constitution.
- Make the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA) a **single unified labour law**, ensuring equal coverage for EPZs, non-EPZs and special economic zones.
- Amend labour laws to include specific protections for **unidentified workers**, preventing them from being exploited or excluded from legal and financial support in the event of disasters or disputes.
- Increase **penalties for employers** who fail to provide contracts to all workers.
- Include the **mid-level management** under the definition of worker in BLA and therefore also in the protection of labour laws.

## TRADE UNION FORMATION AND FUNCTIONING

While Bangladesh has ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98, **freedom of association** remains severely restricted in practice. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association, but there is an inconsistency with the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA), which imposes a restrictive **20% threshold for union formation**, limiting workers' ability to establish unions.

The current environment for union formation and functioning at the workplace level is marked by a **lack of trust**. **Management's retaliatory actions** against union leaders and workers attempting to organise create a hostile atmosphere. For instance, articles such as 23, 26, 27, and 180 of the labour laws are often used by employers as tools for “**freedom of termination**” and “**freedom of coercion**,” allowing them to prevent union formation or retaliate against workers trying to organize, by dismissing them.

In Export Processing Zones (EPZs), the **Workers' Welfare Associations (WWA)** lack genuine freedom of association, and the Department for Inspection of Factories and Establishments (DIFE) has no jurisdiction in these zones. The process of forming WWAs is complicated and controlled largely by the Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA), making it a top-down approach rather than worker-driven. The **grievance process in EPZs**—particularly access to labour courts and remedies for unfair terminations—remains complex and non-transparent.

Finally, the government's expansion of **special economic zones** threatens to further undermine freedom of association, as these zones are likely to continue discouraging unionisation.

Despite the Government's efforts to simplify the **online trade union registration** process, significant **technical challenges** persist. Many workers and union leaders lack access to smartphones or face literacy barriers, preventing them from completing the registration process. Local authorities also obstruct the process by refusing to accept the appropriate documents or demanding documents that are not legally required.

**Data visibility and transparency** are crucial for accountability, but there is often a lack of control over who holds and uses worker-related data, and CSOs and trade unions should have access to information on the databases and how they are used.

Moreover, trade unions in Bangladesh suffer from **poor internal organisation** and usually do not maintain their **own membership databases**. This lack of accurate data weakens their ability to effectively represent workers, organise protests, or conduct collective bargaining. Trust and recognition issues between different trade unions further hinder progress in social dialogue.

There is a pressing need for a **new generation of labour leaders** who can embrace modern tools such as digital platforms and social media to advance the labour movement. This new leadership must reflect the diversity of the workforce, including **younger workers** and **women**, and be better equipped to navigate the complexities of today's labour environment.

### **Recommendations**

- Remove the **highly restrictive threshold to union formation** of 20% and replace with a **minimum absolute number** (e.g. 10 workers).
- Revise the Bangladesh Labour Act (BLA) to **prevent employers from misusing specific articles, particularly those related to contract termination**, as a means to retaliate against workers attempting to organize unions.
- Allow for **trade union formation and functioning in export-processing zones**, to ensure equal rights of all workers.
- **Support workers data collection** in collaboration with trade unions and CSOs, who can access and use worker-related data for negotiation and advocate for labour protection.
- Ensure universal access to the online TU registration process **through trainings and resources to workers and union leaders** who face technical or literacy barriers.

## REFORMING LABOUR ADMINISTRATION

**Challenges with transparency** are prevalent in the key labour administration institutions in Bangladesh, including the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE), Department of Labour (DoL), and Department for Inspection of Factories and Establishments (DIFE).

Provisions that **shield government officials from accountability—particularly in cases of corruption**—are embedded in various laws, regulations, and civil service rules. These immunity clauses create opportunities for bribery and influence from business owners, which often prevent the proper enforcement of labour laws.

Labour laws must be enforced consistently, holding employers and factory owners accountable for violations. However, government officials often adopt a lenient stance toward factory owners and businesses, undermining labour rights and allowing violations to persist. Without proper oversight and reform, these institutions are unlikely to fulfill their mandate to protect labour rights. To enhance transparency, the practice of **filing Right to Information (RTI) requests** must be encouraged, allowing stakeholders to access important labour-related data.

**Workers and unions are legally barred from independently filing cases** against employers for unfair labour practices. Both **DoL and DIFE lack the authority to directly impose penalties for labour violations**, and must pursue them through labour courts. However, they lack the capacity to see cases through, often facing highly experienced lawyers hired by employers. As a result, the majority of cases in labour courts involve minor infractions, such as an employer's failure to maintain required records, which leads to small fines rather than serious repercussions for employers.

In cases where DoL prosecutes employers for more serious offences, such as **unfair labour practices**, these cases are extremely rare. Furthermore, DoL lacks the authority to reinstate unfairly dismissed workers, especially those dismissed due to unionising. While a **Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)** exists for handling **anti-union discrimination**, it is rarely applied within the required **55-day timeline**. This failure significantly weakens the ability of unions to form and function effectively.

Despite a ten-fold increase in DIFE's manpower since the Rana Plaza disaster (from 64 to over 600 inspectors), it continues to fall short in protecting workers' rights. A high number of cases filed

through the **DIFE helpline** does not translate into meaningful resolutions for workers. The **EPZ helpline** is non-functional, with little action taken on worker complaints.

There is a lack of transparency regarding the processes these helplines follow to address complaints – key issues such as whether the helplines have a clear legal mandate or what types of complaints they can handle remain unclear. DIFE also has limited jurisdiction in Export Processing Zones (EPZs), where its ability to enforce labour rights is even more restricted.

Moreover, **legal aid providers** primarily address **wage theft** cases, often overlooking **anti-association practices**, leaving many union-related grievances unaddressed by the **legal system**. **Justice is often delayed** in cases of **anti-union discrimination** and **unfair labour practices**, even though the law stipulates a **150-day resolution period** (60 days for complaints and 90 days for court rulings). In practice, however, these cases frequently take **2-3 years** to resolve, denying workers **timely justice**.

Finally, the **High Court's Directive** on eliminating **sexual harassment** in the workplace is regularly violated. The **Bangladesh Labour Rules (BLR) of 2022** further contradict this directive by failing to require **external members** on **anti-harassment committees**, which weakens their effectiveness.

## Recommendations

- *Revise legal provisions that shield government officials in cases of wrongdoing, such as bribery or corruption, to ensure accountability of institutions.*
- *Strengthen mechanisms to easily allow for filing Right to Information (RTI) by workers and unions, to enhance transparency of institutions.*
- *Allow workers and unions to independently file case against employers for unfair labour practices.*
- *Empower DoL and DIFE to impose direct penalties on employers for labour law violations, and adequate provisions should be reflected in the BLA.*
- *Reinforce the implementation of the Standard Operating Procedure on Anti-Union Discrimination.*
- *Assess and reinforce implementation of the High Court Directive on Sexual Harassment, and ensure anti-harassment in labour laws as well.*

## INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND WORKERS' GRIEVANCES

**Industrial disputes**, especially those concerning minimum wage and living wage demands, often escalate into protests. However, the government tends to focus on minimizing the protests rather than addressing the root causes.

**Workplace complaint mechanisms** are weak and do not provide reliable avenues for workers to voice grievances without fear of retaliation. There are reports of employers misusing **surveillance data**, such as CCTV footage, against workers during disputes. This can lead to **blacklisting, job loss or legal charges**, exacerbating insecurity for workers trying to organize. Additionally, the presence of

both factory inspectors and industrial police inspectors tends to exacerbate industrial disputes rather than resolve them, often worsening the situation.

There is a strong need to **democratize data management**, allowing civil society organizations (CSOs) and trade unions to access and use this data for negotiation and labour protection purposes. Building a **collaborative platform** around data would significantly strengthen labour rights and improve transparency in workplace monitoring.

A longstanding **lack of trust** between workers, unions, and management is a major obstacle to resolving worker grievances peacefully. The absence of adequate legal provisions for addressing grievances at individual, factory, and sectoral levels increases tensions. To address this, **labour laws** need to be amended to facilitate **workers' representation at the sectoral level** in grievance processes. In situations where factory-level unions are absent, federations should obtain permission from factory workers to represent them in grievance resolution processes.

### Recommendations

- Increase and enforce **penalties for anti-union discrimination and unfair labour practices** (e.g. blacklisting, contract termination and legal charges).
- Ensure that workers and trade unions have **the right to information** and access to workers' databases that concern them, both owned by employers and by the government.
- Amend labour laws to ensure workers have **the right to representation** in grievance processes at the sectoral level, enabling effective participation in addressing disputes.

## TACKLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT

**Anti-harassment committees** are often ineffective because the factory management often selects representatives, instead of workers. This creates a conflict of interest and prevents fair investigations, as workers fear retaliation or job loss if they report harassment. As a result, many workers remain silent, and harassment goes unaddressed.

The absence of specific laws addressing **sexual harassment** in the workplace results in poorly handled cases. Investigations are not guided by clear rules, leaving survivors without proper protection and contributing to the ineffectiveness of harassment prevention mechanisms.

**Retaliation against survivors of harassment** is common, with no strong protections in place. Many workers prioritize job security over reporting harassment, as fear of job loss often outweighs the desire to address the issue. This further undermines the effectiveness of anti-harassment committees, which fail to protect workers adequately.

### Recommendations

- Extend **the right to workers to appoint their representatives** in anti-harassment committees, and ensure representation of external members, from outside factories.


- Define and standardise procedures to investigate sexual harassment, while protecting victims against retaliation.

# What are the biggest challenges workers face in Bangladesh?

86 responses



# How much are workers' voices included in the making of policies and laws?





# 2

## SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN THE LABOUR SECTOR

The **effectiveness of social dialogue institutions**, such as the **Tripartite Consultative Committee (TCC)** and the **Tripartite Labour Law Review Committee**, is hindered by their **consultative nature**, which inherently makes them weak. These institutions are not legally required to implement recommendations from workers, and the absence of clear operational rules further diminishes their impact. **Dissenting opinions are neither recorded nor addressed**, making it difficult for workers' concerns to be properly considered.

### WAGE SETTING MECHANISMS

The **wage gap continues to widen**, with no limit to profit maximization, worsening workers' conditions. To resolve disputes, there are two options: **demonstrations or dialogue**. The latter rarely works, when it comes to 46 minimum wage boards in formal sectors, who are supposed to set wages that reflect the preferences of workers, employers, and market conditions.

Many believe that **bias exists in the minimum wage boards** and the current wage determination system, making decisions that do not fully reflect workers' interests. Historically, final wage decisions would often come from the Prime Minister's office, undermining the fairness and independence of the wage boards. There is a call to ensure that wage-setting processes consider **living wage criteria** so that workers' basic needs are met.

Over the past 16 years, the government's practice of **appointing trade union representatives to wage boards who are aligned with its interests** has weakened the independence of trade unions and perpetuated malpractice within the system. Also, review of wages takes place every five years, which is too long. The **reviews should happen every two to three years** instead of the current five-year period due to rising inflation and the cost of living.

The decision-making process is undemocratic, with **employers' interests dominating discussions**, excluding workers' input. There is a need for **clear qualifications or criteria for selecting wage board members**, including sectoral knowledge, to ensure fair representation. **Research on living wages** is often neglected or manipulated, further affecting the wage-setting process. In some export-oriented sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, wages have remained stagnant since 2017, highlighting the ongoing disconnection between wage boards and workers' needs.

### Recommendations

- *Ensure that workers can **democratically select their own representatives** on minimum wage boards.*
- *Mandate the review of wages every 2-3 years, and **enforce wage reviews across all sectors** as required by law.*
- ***Commission research on living wages** to serve as the basis for evidence-based wage-setting discussions.*

- *Introduce qualification criteria for the selection of wage board members to ensure fair and balanced representation.*

## TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIVE COUNCILS (TCCs)

The **National Tripartite Consultative Committee (NTCC)** and **Ready-Made Garment (RMG) TCCs** are **not fully functional**, meeting irregularly and ineffectively. The RMG TCC, for example, has convened only once in 18 months to discuss holiday matters. Without clear operational rules and legal obligations to act on workers' recommendations, these bodies remain weak. **Dissenting views are not formally recorded or addressed**, further undermining the dialogue process.

Private sector and political connections influence appointments in TCCs, reducing their effectiveness. Additionally, gender-specific issues such as maternity benefits and gender-based violence should become integral parts of the social dialogue, as these issues affect the well-being of workers, particularly women.

Meetings of the 60 member RMG-TCC, are unpredictable and often lack an agenda, making them **performative rather than productive**. Proper follow-up on decisions is rarely conducted, and trust and recognition issues between social partners continue to hinder dialogue. The RMG-TCC needs to be revitalized to fulfill its intended purpose.

### Recommendations

- *Provide a greater autonomy for Tripartite Consultative Councils in the operational rules.*
- *Mandate TCCs to formally record and consider dissenting views during discussions, ensuring transparency in decision follow-ups.*
- *Ensure transparent and democratic selection of workers' representatives in TCCs.*

## COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Trade unions must establish strong collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) to prevent worker protests and violent clashes. However, unions face **interference from factory management and government officials**, making wage negotiations difficult. In factories where there are multiple unions, determining which one will act as the **collective bargaining agent** requires a complicated DoL-owned procedure.

Trade union federations could help support factory-level unions by representing them in collective bargaining, as they typically have more capacity. However, government agencies, which should facilitate proper CBAs, often favor factory owners over workers, taking a lenient approach toward management while being harsh on workers.

A big obstacle to collective bargaining at the factory level are the **participation committees (PCs)** introduced by the government, which are often seen as an attempt to undermine trade union rights. PCs are not a legitimate substitute for trade unions and collective bargaining.

Employers deflect criticism by touting their corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts, while brands involved in supply chains prefer to keep wage discussions to a minimum to protect purchasing practices. **Employers often resist wage increases**, including when brands are ready to pay increased prices, fearing that agreeing to demands in one factory will lead to similar demands elsewhere. Also, there are cases reported of unions submitting Charters of Demand, only to face **harassment from law enforcement and intimidation tactics**.

### Recommendations

- *Simplify the rules and procedures for the selection of collective bargaining agents.*
- *Grant trade union federations the mandate to support factory-level unions in collective bargaining negotiations, with explicit permission from the local unions and workers.*

## TRIPARTITE LABOUR LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE (TLRC)

The Tripartite Labour Law Review Committee is designed to have equal representation from government, employers, and workers' rights organizations. However, there is a strong sense that government and employers often align, isolating workers' representatives during discussions. This unbalanced dialogue limits the committee's effectiveness in addressing workers' concerns.

To create a more balanced committee, it has been suggested to **include representatives from labour court associations, bar associations, or labour court judges**, which would help create a neutral environment for more effective labour law reforms.

### Recommendations

- *Include representatives from labour court associations, bar associations, or labour court judges in the Tripartite Labour Law Review Committee (TLRC) to enhance trust and ensure balanced decision-making within the committee.*

## REPRESENTATION ISSUES

In addition to leaders from trade union federations, **civil society organizations (CSOs) and trade unions (TUs) from the grassroots level**, need to actively engage in the reform process, working closely with the government to **provide guidance and recommendations**, including around the just


transitions. For example, as a good practice, worker networks involving 2,000 sanitation workers and waste pickers have been created to raise workers' voices from the local to national levels.

Additionally, **the lack of youth representation** in social dialogue institutions, such as the NTCC, is a critical gap, as many youth are entering the workforce and receiving minimum wages. Finally, there is **no gender balance in social dialogue bodies** such as the NTCC or the RMG TCC, despite the many gender-related issues—such as maternity rights and reproductive health—that need to be addressed.


## Recommendations

- *Ensure the inclusion of grassroots unionists, youth, and women in social dialogue discussions to represent diverse perspectives and strengthen decision-making.*

## Do you think workers' rights and protections have been expanding or shrinking in the last 10 years?



## How optimistic are you about achieving significant labour reforms under the National Action Plan and the ILO-GoB Roadmap by 2026?



# 3 CHILD LABOUR AND FORCED LABOUR

## GAPS IN ADDRESSING CHILD LABOUR

The government of Bangladesh has committed to eliminating child labour in 38 sectors by 2025, with specific efforts focused on strengthening regulatory frameworks, enhancing investigation capacities, and implementing projects in hazardous sectors such as bricks, footwear, and leather industries. However, with 2025 approaching, there is **little evidence of a comprehensive government roadmap to meet its child labour elimination targets**.

The government claims that 100,000 children have reportedly been removed from hazardous work, and that sectors like leather and footwear are now child labour-free. However, **government data lack accuracy and do not reflect the realities on the ground**. For instance, in sectors such as leather and footwear, but also garments, which are all declared child labour-free, fake national IDs are still used to employ underage workers in factories. Children in informal sectors like domestic work, agriculture, and flower industries are often neglected in official reports.

A critical issue lies in the **lack of a national tracking system** to validate the progress of child labour elimination. Although the government claims to have removed these children from hazardous work, there is no system in place to track whether they have been rehabilitated or returned to their homes. The Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments (DIFE) relies heavily on paper-based reports, which are often unverified and inconsistent.

Although 14-17 year olds are legally allowed to work in non-hazardous sectors, employers usually don't want to hire them, leading them to informal, hazardous sectors. There are **gaps in vocational training and skill-building programs** for children removed from labour. The absence of a clear linking program between education and vocational training leaves many children without opportunities to transition away from hazardous work. This **lack of a comprehensive rehabilitation framework** is a significant barrier to the elimination of child labour.

### Recommendations

- **Significantly increase penalties for employers involved in child labour violations, including cases of using fake identity cards.**
- **Enhance transparency in data collection and reporting to accurately reflect progress in child labour elimination efforts.**
- **Implement a comprehensive digital tracking system to monitor children removed from hazardous work, ensuring their rehabilitation and transition into education or vocational training programs.**
- **Invest in vocational training and skills development to provide legal employment pathways as alternatives to hazardous work for children.**

## ROOT CAUSES OF CHILD LABOUR

There are an **estimated 1.2 million children at risk of becoming child labourers**. Young girls face additional vulnerabilities, including sexual harassment and exploitation. This is prevalent in both formal sectors, such as garment factories, and informal sectors, such as domestic work. Girls in domestic settings often face dehumanizing treatment, with one example highlighting how young domestic workers are left to care for babies while being fed leftover food and sleeping in kitchens.

The root cause of child labour is the lack of a living wage. Parents who are not paid enough to support their families are forced to send their children to work in hazardous conditions to supplement household income. This problem extends beyond export-oriented industries and affects informal sectors like domestic work and agriculture. **The advocacy for living wages is therefore seen as essential in addressing child labour.**

Living wages discussions should be complemented by social protection schemes. For instance, an estimate is that **an allocation of BDT 2,000 per month per child, covering education and nutrition costs, would significantly reduce the incidence of child labour.**

The National Child Labour Elimination Policy (2010) and the National Plan of Action (NPA) provide the policy framework for addressing child labour, but the effectiveness of these policies is questioned. The revised NPA remains incompletely implemented, and the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the problem, increasing school dropouts and child labour.

### Recommendations

- **Establish living wage standards across all sectors** to address poverty among parents, a key root cause of child labour.
- **Invest in social protection schemes** that support children's education and nutrition needs to prevent child labour.
- **Strengthen protections for girls** in both formal and informal sectors by enforcing stricter laws against sexual harassment and exploitation, particularly in vulnerable roles like domestic work.

## COORDINATION CHALLENGES

The **National Child Labour Monitoring Cell**, established by the government, does not function regularly and lacks adequate tracking systems, which further hampers efforts to monitor and address child labour issues.

Also, there is a **lack of coordination between the many NGOs and CSOs** working on child labour. While hundreds of NGOs are involved, there is no centralized database or coordination platform to monitor their activities or progress, leading to gaps in reporting and transparency.

Furthermore, there is **limited involvement of these organizations in the government's National Welfare Council for Child Labour**. Despite the significant number of organisations involved in child labour prevention, only a few are recognized by the government, complicating efforts to track progress and coordinate effective interventions.

### Recommendations

- **Strengthen the National Child Labour Monitoring Cell** by regularizing monitoring processes, ensuring consistent operation, with regular meetings and follow-ups.
- **Establish a centralized, government-led platform** to coordinate with civil society organizations for joint monitoring and reporting on child labour elimination progress.

## THE PERSISTENT ISSUE OF FORCED LABOUR

Forced labour continues to be a significant issue in Bangladesh, especially in the informal sector. Using the ILO's guiding indicators of forced labour, it becomes clear that while the Ready-Made Garments (RMG) sector has some forced labour characteristics, it presents a medium risk compared to the informal sector, where conditions are much worse.

In the formal sector, laws stipulate an 8-hour workday and a 6-day workweek, but workers often face **7-day workweeks, including Fridays and Saturdays**. In the informal sector, particularly in domestic work, agriculture, and local RMG, the abuse of vulnerability is rampant. Workers frequently engage in labour **without clear terms of employment** or adequate working conditions.

Deception is particularly rampant in informal sectors, where it is very common for workers to be unaware of the conditions they will face. Children in domestic labour, hotels, and brick fields experience highly restricted movement, raising concerns about forced labour.

In both formal and informal sectors, **physical and sexual abuse** are prevalent. **Intimidation and threats** are commonly used to suppress worker rights. A troubling issue is the **retention of identity documents**, particularly among younger workers who use false identity documents to bypass age restrictions.

**Withholding wages** is common in the informal RMG sector, where workers often go unpaid for months, forced into debt bondage through informal loans. Living and working conditions in sectors like plastic factories and brick kilns remain inhumane, and **excessive overtime** is widespread across sectors. Finally, preventing abuse of the Section 105 of the BLA, dealing with restrictions on protests, is important to tackle forced labour.

In conclusion, forced labour remains a significant problem in both the formal and informal sectors of Bangladesh, particularly in industries like RMG and agriculture, where child labour and other exploitative practices continue to thrive, particularly **in the lower tiers**.

### Recommendations




- **Review and update labour laws** to align with ILO guiding principles for combating forced labour.
- **Mandate employment contracts in both formal and informal sectors**, clearly outlining terms of employment, wages, and working conditions to prevent exploitation and deception.
- **Strengthen protections against the retention of identity documents** and prevent the use of false identity documents, particularly for underage workers.
- **Reinforce prohibitions against withholding wages** and address debt bondage more explicitly in the labour laws.

## In one word, tell us one thing that you see as key to speeding up the implementation of labour reforms?

38 responses



## Do you believe trade unions and civil society organisations can jointly make a difference?





## **LIST OF PARTICIPATING CSOs AND TRADE UNIONS**

**Akota Garments Workers Federation**  
**AWAJ Foundation**  
**Bangladesh Apparels Workers Federation**  
**Bangladesh Center for Workers' Solidarity**  
**Bangladesh Free Trade Union Congress**  
**Bangladesh Garment & Industrial Workers Federation**  
**Bangladesh Independent Garment works Union Federation**  
**Bangladesh Institute of Labour Studies**  
**Bangladesh Labour Foundation**  
**Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust**  
**Bangladesh Nari Sramik Kendra**  
**Bangladesh Revolutionary Garments Workers Federation**  
**Bangladesh Trade Union Centre**  
**BRAC**  
**CARE Bangladesh**  
**Clean Clothes Campaign**  
**Ethical Trading Initiative Bangladesh**  
**Fair Wear**  
**Global Fund for Children**  
**Global Rights Compliance**  
**IndustriALL Bangladesh Council**  
**Jatio Sramik Federation**  
**Laudes Foundation**  
**Mondiaal FNV**  
**National Coordination Committee for Workers' Education**  
**National Garment Workers Federation**  
**OSHE Foundation Bangladesh**  
**Practical Action Bangladesh**  
**Safety & Rights**  
**Shadhin Bangla Garments Sramik Karmachari Federation**  
**Socialist Labour Front**  
**Solidarity Center**  
**Tannery Workers Union**  
**Terre Des Hommes Italy**  
**The Centre for Child Rights and Business**  
**TU ILS Youth Group**  
**UNI Global Union Bangladesh**  
**Union to Union**  
**United Federation of Workers in Denmark**  
**VSO Bangladesh**  
**Workers' Resource Centre**

**& international organisations/ agencies:**  
**GIZ Bangladesh**  
**International Labour Organization**



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