Check against delivery! 

Thank you all for attending this press conference after my last Foreign Affairs Council in Defence format.  

Over the last [five] years, I chaired 64 [formal] Council meetings, including 9 in Defence Ministers’ format, 30 informal Ministerials [meetings], 29 videoconferences. I do not know how many times we have been meeting in different formats. And everything reaches an end.  

Today has been my last Defence Ministers [Council]. You know the Foreign Affairs Ministers [Council meetings] take hours. They are very long. Yesterday, we spent the whole day.  

The Defence Ministers Councils are shorter. It does not mean that they are less important. Maybe it is because the Defence Ministers discuss things in a shorter and sharper way, and they like concrete results. 

Today, we can report about concrete achievements in our defence and security. Let me have a look at what we did during these last five years. 

First, we put the European Peace Facility into action and through European Peace Facility we have provided support to over 20 countries around the world – it is not just Ukraine. In fact, the European Peace Facility was not conceived to support Ukraine; it was conceived for other purposes. And in fact, we have been using the European Peace Facility for other purposes. 20 countries around the world have benefitted from the support of the European Peace Facility. 

Second, we agreed on the Strategic Compass, which I could say was a kind of a white book on European Defence, because it was about how to organise the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It was approved more or less at the same time when Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine.  

At that time, nobody was talking about [EU’s] security and defence. I think it was the first time when we launched the idea that security and defence at the European level have to be very high on the agenda – and certainly it has been very high on the agenda. 

Third, we strengthened our capacities on cyber and to face hybrid threats. We improved our defence capacities [and] strengthened the European defence industry together with my fellow Commissioner Thierry Breton. We published the European Defence Industrial Strategy together with the Commission, and we put defence industry as a priority in the development of industrial sectors.  

We launched important missions and operations for crisis management – in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, Mozambique, Moldova, Armenia and to train Ukrainian soldiers. The most successful mission has been to train almost  70.000 Ukrainian soldiers.  

Denmark abandoned its opt-out from defence and joined the European Defence Agency. New partners from outside the European Union are looking to enhance cooperation on security and defence. They are keen to join our defence initiatives on PESCO, CSDP missions and operations, and to look for military support from the European Peace Facility.  

We have taken unprecedented decisions on military support to Ukraine. We talk about €45 billion on military weapon deliveries, training missions, European Peace Facility assistance – part of this money is coming from the [extraordinary revenues generated from] Russian frozen assets.  

This is what we have done during the last years. Today, this morning, before the Council, I chaired the last Steering Board of European Defence Agency (EDA), which is an important body for European defence. It has been working silently, maybe without having as much attention as it deserves, stimulating progress in European Union capability development, through joint procurement, and launching concrete defence projects. 

The European Defence Agency has contributed a lot to boost defence cooperation within the European Union and defence readiness in these challenging times. Today, at the last meeting of the European Defence Agency Board, we had the opportunity to sign the Letters of Intent on collaborative opportunities in four important capability areas: on Integrated Air and Missile Defence, on Loitering Munitions, on Electronic Warfare and on the European Combat Vessel. 

These Letters of Intent have been signed by an important number of Members in order to develop together these capacities. I want to congratulate European Defence Agency for this success. This is an important step towards building together military capabilities for European armies. 

Now, we go to the [agenda of the] Council: 

It is clear that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is the biggest threat to the European security and stability since the end of the Second World War. It is good to remind that security is the most important asset for a society. If there is no security, it is difficult to build anything else. 

Security can be against foreign enemies or can also be against natural disasters, the threats of nature. As, for example, today, the military capacities of the Spanish army are being mobilised to support people in Valencia affected by the [storm] DANA.  

But war is a different thing. And, unhappily, the war came back to the borders of Europe. It is becoming increasingly a global security risk, at the borders of Europe, the eastern borders of Europe and in many other places around the world. 

The war against Ukraine is affecting directly our values and principles. The fate of the Ukrainians will determine the destiny of the European Union.  

That is what Member [States] discussed today – and by an overwhelming majority, they considered it exactly [like] this. The fate of Ukraine will determine the destiny of the European Union. If Putin could be successful in Ukraine, we will all pay a very high bill, much more expensive than any kind of military support that we could provide today. 

Today is the 1,000^th days of Putin’s full-scale war – but it is also 4,000 days since the first invasion of Crimea. 

Since then, maybe we have not been using time in order to prepare our [defence] capacities. [German Defence] Minister [Boris] Pistorius rightly said that today. 

Since 2014, until now, the Europeans have gone through a silent process of disarmament, not recovering quickly the military capacities that they lost after the Eurocrisis. 

But today we have to regain these capacities by standing together, by taking courageous decisions, by committing to supporting Ukraine with all possible means; and, in doing so, to send a powerful signal to Putin that Europe will not be divided and will not renounce the support of Ukraine.  

Ukraine was at the centre of our discussion today. Two Ukrainian representatives attended the meeting through videoconference. We were joined by the new North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Secretary General  Mark Rutte, the two [Ukrainian] partners – the Defence Minister of Ukraine, [Rustem] Umerov, and Presidential Advisor on Strategic Issues Oleksandr Kamyshin. We discussed, at the end of the day, during the lunch, with Special Advisor [Sauli] Niinistö, who presented recently a report on Preparedness for the European Union.  

Allow me to recall that the Member States have supported Ukraine with about €45 billion on military support. It is not a negligeable amount. Certainly, it is less than the United States, but not much less. €45 billion of military support.  

We have reached our objective of one million artillery ammunition rounds that have already been delivered to Ukraine. Few days ago, we were at 99% and, certainly, some months later than expected but these one million ammunitions have already been delivered to Ukraine. 

We will continue doing that, because Russia continues receiving a substantial delivery of ammunition and missiles from North Korea and Iran. Without the support of North Korea and Iran, Russia would not be able to continue waging this war. 

Regarding the European Peace Facility, which is the instrument that we use since the beginning – I remember very well when we decided to use the European Peace Facility to arm Ukraine the first day of Russia’s aggression. Unhappily, there has not been progress on my proposal to move forward with the political agreement to reimburse these €6.6 billion of military assistance to Ukraine. We are still in a blockage, and I instructed the technical bodies of the Council to continue working for a solution. 

On the other hand, we have been receiving and using the extraordinary revenues coming from Russia’s immobilised assets; it is well underway. We expect more deliveries to Ukraine before the end of the year, being financed by these Russian immobilised assets’ revenues.  

From the first tranche, we are using €400 million to invest directly in Ukraine’s defence industry. After my visit to Ukraine, I came back fully convinced that the best way of supporting militarily Ukraine is to boost their own industrial capacity. 

They are developing very quickly, very well, at a very competitive price. Developing modern technologies in the field of drones, in particular. It is very important and interesting to invest and boost this industrial capacity, avoiding and saving logistic and transportation issues. 

We will have to put our strong efforts in order to link the industrial capacities of Ukraine into the industrial ecosystem of European defence. 

I proposed that a larger part of the second tranche of the windfall profits that will be available in March or April [next year], will be focusing on purchasing military equipment to the benefit of Ukraine directly – directly to their own industrial capacity.  

We also addressed the future of our Military Assistance Mission [EUMAM Ukraine with] 65.000 Ukrainian soldiers trained. We are the largest provider for Ukrainian capacities for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  

I called [on] the Ministers to reconsider my proposal of establishing a coordination cell in Kyiv directly [under EUMAM]. It is not escalating; it is just putting in Kyiv a cell that could coordinate better our activities with the needs of the Ukranian armed forces. 

We discussed with NATO’s Secretary General [Mark Rutte], and the discussion went quickly to the level of expenditure. 

We are almost there, all together, Member States – some more than others. All together we are at about 1.9% of military expenditure – but, according to our discussion with the Secretary General, it looks like this 2% figure will not be enough.  

In order to face the challenges we are facing, this landmark - this mythical figure of 2% - will not be enough. We need to take more action. As I have said many times – we have to do more and faster. We have seen through the war against Ukraine that we need to step up our defence capabilities. 

Allow me to say strongly this motto: Europeans have to do more and quicker, in order to increase their defence capacity. Not just to support Ukraine, but for our own security. 

We see that in the [Russian] war against Ukraine, Russia is getting support from China, North Korea, Iran and others. This is an escalation in deep contrast without any intention to seek peace.  

I repeat: without this support – of North Korea, Iran and China – Russia would not be able to continue waging the war to the same degree.  

Today, China is the largest provider of dual-use goods and sensitive items that sustain Russia’s military industrial base. About 80% of these goods are being provided by China.  

Finally, we received the Special Advisor for Preparedness, Mr [Sauli] Niinistö. We discussed in-depth where we can do more. We can do more from an industrial point of view. We can do more, from the financial point of view. The European Investment Bank can play a crucial role by providing the resources necessary to support these initiatives on the field of research and development. 

We have to continue developing the European Defence Industrial Strategy without delay and we have to prepare all national capacities in order to make Europe a safer place in the world.  

We will continue working together with the Commission. As I said before, the Strategic Compass – that was published immediately after the war in Ukraine – was a kind of first white paper, without having this name. It was the first approach to develop the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  

Let me remind that security and defence remain a national competence, but the European institutions can provide support to the development of this national competence, making [Member States] to work together and, in particular, receiving funding and a coordinated approach for the industry of defence.  

Now, after this press conference, I will have the pleasure to co-sign another important document: a Security and Defence Partnership with the Republic of North Macedonia. This is another security partnership that we are signing. We also agreed a Security and Defence Partnership with Albania, but its signing will be taking place at a later stage. 

Let me remind that I was in South Korea [and] in Japan, some weeks ago, signing exactly the same kind of instruments - Security and Defence Partnership - to show that the European Union is more than an economic union. It is a political union with responsibilities on all parts of political life – including security and defence.  

Without security, nothing is possible. Let’s work hard in order to ensure that Europeans join [forces in their] security – something that is becoming a rare situation in the world, because we live in a much insecure world today than five years before. 

Thank you for your attention. 

Q. While you were gathering, while the ministers were gathering in the room, the decision of Putin to change his nuclear doctrine was announced. I would like to understand if this was discussed during the meeting. While this is not the first time that Putin threatens with nuclear weapons, I would like to understand if you see anything different this time.  

Well, the fact that they [Russian authorities] announced this update of their nuclear doctrine, coinciding with 1,000 days of Russia’s war against Ukraine, has something of a symbolic [nature]. It is not the first time that they threaten with nuclear escalation, which is completely irresponsible. Russia has subscribed to the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and, so, must never be fought”. Any call for nuclear warfare is an irresponsibility. We have to call it the way it is. It is not the first time that Putin plays the nuclear game ball. He also created food and energy security crises. It is not the first time that he uses everything he can in order to create insecurity – [take] North Korean troops in European soil – but to call for nuclear [weapons], [to] talk about nuclear deterrence is something that we strongly reject. We condemn any reference to the use of nuclear arms, and it is certainly being done on purpose on this specific date. 

Q. I understand you discussed European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) today. I just wonder if you could say something about the appetite among the European Union Members for letting non-European Union members join the programme. If there is a conflict there, or if it that is open. 

We have not discussed this in this detail.  

Q. High Representative, as you know, there have been incidents involving two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. Were those incidents discussed at all today, and more generally, do you fear, is there any sense among the ministers, A, that Russia is responsible for these specific incidents, and B, that you fear greater hybrid or other responses to the decision to allow the use of long-range strikes inside Russia by the Americans, and possibly by European powers?  

We have commented this incident with the first information that we got. We cannot attribute this incident to anyone. It would be irresponsible from my side to attribute this, let's say, incident or accident, or whatever you want to call it, to anyone. It would be putting wood to the fire. It is not my intention. And I do not want neither to relate this incident with, it seems, the first use of long-range missiles after the authorisation of President Biden to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 

Q. Sur la Facilité Européenne pour la Paix, est-ce que vous pouvez nous expliquer ce qui bloque encore ? Lors du dernier Conseil en Affaires étrangères en octobre, vous aviez dit que vous espériez un accord avant d’aller en Ukraine et vous êtes allé en Ukraine depuis, est-ce que c’est un échec pour vous le fait que c’est toujours bloqué et que possiblement à la fin de votre mandat dans quelques jours se sera toujours bloqué ?  

Ce n’est pas un succès. Sans doute, ce n’est pas un succès, mais pas seulement pour moi mais pour l’ensemble des États membres qui attendent d’être remboursés. Il faut que je signale une fois de plus que le matériel militaire a été fourni à l’Ukraine. Ce sont les États membres qui attendent d’être remboursés. Ce blocage continue parce que la Hongrie continue à refuser l’accord, sa participation telle qu’elle était prévue, dans la procédure normale de la facilité pour la paix. J’ai essayé de trouver des possibles solutions mais toutes les solutions que j’ai mises sur la table, pour une raison ou pour une autre, ne faisaient pas l’accord des autres. Alors, quand on trouvait l’accord des uns, on n’avait pas l’accord des autres et finalement la responsabilité majeure est dans les côtés de la Hongrie, qui a été le régime du blocage. J’ai essayé de torturer l’imagination de façon à trouver une solution acceptable pour tous et malheureusement cela n’a pas été possible. J’ai envoyé cela au groupe de travail du Comité politique et j’espère qu’ils vont trouver une solution. Peut-être que ma successeure sera plus fortunée que moi.  

Q. Yesterday you said that to speak the language of power, the European Union should be united – but it is not easy to be united in Europe. You have just mentioned one case, but it is not the only one. Do you think that this European Union is ready, after three years of war in Ukraine, for this new era of war? So, for the perspective to have Russia threatening directly the European Union territory, and to go to war in case of necessity. 

Well, we are not belligerent in this war. We are not part of this war. We are just supporting Ukraine with military capabilities – but there are no European troops in Ukraine. It is not foreseen for Russia to face European troops in the battlefield. The important thing is to measure the willingness of the European Member States to continue supporting Ukraine. Certainly, we are in a different scenario with a different president in the White House [soon], who seems to have ideas about how to end the war. Today, the Ministers of Defense, as well as yesterday the Ministers of Foreign Affairs - I can say that a big majority - maybe with a couple of exceptions – show their determination to continue supporting Ukraine. That is what I can tell you. Yes, there are a couple of Member States, that is not a secret, that are not so much enthusiastic with the idea of continuing supporting militarily Ukraine. But their contribution to the overall efforts is not as important from the quantitative point of view. The others, today, and in particular France, Germany, Poland, Spain, Italy, show their strong commitment to continue supporting Ukraine. 

Q. You know President Biden gave the green light to Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia. Are we on the brink of global nuclear war?  

Nuclear war? I do not see the relationship between the decision taken by President Biden and a hypothetical nuclear war. I said that there is an irresponsibility to use the threat of nuclear weapons. What President Biden has authorised [Ukraine] is to use [weapons] inside the Russian territory, of up to a distance of 300 kilometers from the Russian border – which is quite limited, by the way. [They have allowed] the use of their conventional arms. It seems that today the Russians reported that this authorisation has been used and the first consequences of this American decision has taken place. But it is not the first time that some Member States authorise the use of their weapons to be used inside the Russian territory. The issue has been discussed. This is a national competence, and every Member State will decide what they want to do. But the United States is sending a signal, an important signal that they authorised [it] – in a limited dimension, 300 kilometers is not deep enough inside the Russian territory. This is maybe the first step in order to let the Ukrainians, as I said several times, not only to shut down the arrow, but to hit where the archer is. This is something that the Ukrainians are requesting for a long time. I have been in particular supportive of this request, because I think first it is in accordance with the rule of law, international law, and secondly, the Ukrainians need to be able to answer to the Russian attacks even if they are taking place from the Russian territory. 

Q. Je vous écoute, je vous lis et je voudrais savoir à quoi sert le poste du Haut Représentant. Je vous ai entendu hier, vous n’étiez pas informé, vous avez des propositions, vous faites ce que vous pensez est bon, et vous n’êtes pas suivi. En fait, on ne vous aime pas à la Commission, on ne vous aime pas aux États membres, et vous êtes perdu entre les deux, à vous battre comme Don Quichotte contre les moulins – vous connaissez très bien Don Quichotte. Est-ce-que c’est vraiment ça le Haut Représentant ? Ce top job que nous tous ici, dans la salle de presse, nous pensons être le plus intéressant et qui finalement est confié - parce que j’ai suivi Madame Mogherini, j’ai suivi Madame Ashton, j’ai même suivi Solana à l’époque ; ça veut dire que ça remonte loin. Je crois que le seul qui avait vraiment une capacité d’action, autant déclaré, c’était Solana. Vous-même, vous ne le reconnaissez. Vous êtes bridé, brimé, frustré. Finalement, est-ce-que nous ne devrons pas supprimer ce poste, et revenir au poste de Solana, quelque chose de plus concret, de plus ramassé et de plus efficace ? Plutôt que cette usine à trois mille cinq cents personnes, que la Commission rêve de prendre dans son giron, qui vous prive de pouvoir, qui vous prive de moyens. Vous êtes obligé de demander de l’argent pour faire valoir vos actions. Enfin, je veux dire, c’est humiliant ! Moi, je n’ai jamais vu quelqu’un d’aussi humilié que le Haut représentant pour l’Action extérieure et ça me choque.  

Merci, merci. Je vous remercie d’avoir attendu le dernier jour pour dire cela. Vous auriez dû me prévenir. On me l’a déjà prévenu au moment de mon hearing. On me l’avait déjà dit. Même [si] dans une façon un petit peu plus courtoise. Ils m’ont dit : êtes-vous conscient que cela est un rôle impossible ? Non, il n’est pas impossible, mais il n’est pas miraculeux. Je pense que, écoutez, si l’Union européenne veut vraiment avoir une politique commune de sécurité et défense, il faut quelqu’un qui l’organise. Je parle de la politique commune de sécurité et défense. Je mets de cote l’activité purement diplomatique. C’est dans les traités. Les traités disent que l’Union européenne veut bâtir une politique commune de sécurité et défense et on charge quelqu’un, qu’on appelle le Haut représentant, pour cela. Il a la capacité de faire des propositions. Les propositions peuvent être acceptées ou pas. Normalement, elles le sont. Parfois, elles ne le sont pas. Et je pense que cette tâche de bâtir une politique commune de sécurité et défense aujourd'hui est plus urgente et nécessaire que jamais. Donc, j’espère que dans le futur la dimension “sécurité et défense” de ce poste sera mise en valeur. On a fait pas mal de choses. Je les ai dites au début. Rien de cela ne se serait arrivé sans avoir quelqu’un au poste de commandement. Et par rapport à la dimension diplomatique, c’est évident que tous les États membres restent maîtres de [leur] politique extérieure. C’est aussi dans les traités. La politique extérieure est encore une compétence nationale et on dit clairement dans les traités “la Commission ne représente pas l’Union dans la politique de sécurité et défense ni dans la politique extérieure”. Ils le disent clairement, les traités. La Commission ne représente pas l’Union dans ces domaines-là. Alors, qui représente l’Union dans ces domaines-là, qui ne sont pas de domaines négligeables ? Les présidents du Conseil européen, d’abord et surtout, et ensuite, au niveau ministériel, le Haut Représentant. Vous me direz : il y a un overlap avec d’autres institutions et on a l’envie peut-être de vouloir jouer le rôle du Haut Représentant de l’Union dans la politique de sécurité et de défense et dans la politique extérieure. Peut-être. Le jeu des institutions est normal. Il y a toujours des tiraillements, mais le rôle est clairement défini. Peut-être, je n’ai pas été capable de le mener d’une façon satisfaisante, mais c’est clair qu’il y a un rôle écrit dans les traités. Qui représente l’Union européenne dans les domaines de la politique extérieure, de sécurité et défense ? Qui la représente ? Le président du Conseil européen et le Haut représentant au niveau ministériel. Si vous croyez que ce n’est pas une tâche suffisante, je vous assure que cela prend beaucoup de temps.  

Thank you, all of you, for your attention during these last five years. 

Merci beaucoup de votre attention pendant ces années.  

Link to video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-263922