Political relations

The role of the Delegation involves reflecting upon political events, developments and trends within Russia, as well as between the EU and the Russian Federation.

The Delegation thus monitors political life in the country, including issues relating to the areas of human rights, justice, freedom and security, and developments in Russia's foreign policy.

The 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine seriously affected the EU-Russia political relations. As a result, many of the policy dialogues and mechanisms of cooperation have been frozen and restrictive measures were adopted. Following the Russian invasion against Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has suspended virtually all remaining cooperation programmes with Russia. The EU has also massively expanded its sanctions package in response to Russia’s unprecedented and unprovoked military attack on Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The measures are designed to weaken the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war and impose clear economic and political costs on the member of Russia’s political elite responsible for the invasion. The EU is steadfast in its support to Ukraine, and has made repeated calls to Russia to immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all forces and military equipment from Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

Until the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, the EU and Russia cooperated with each other in numerous fields and had established a long-term partnership based on the the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into force in 1997. The EU-Russia cooperation covered among others, trade and economy, energy, climate change, research and education, culture as well as various international security questions. Fostering people-to-people contacts and providing support to Russian civil society, human rights defenders and independent media has also been always an important element of the EU’s engagement in Russia. Moreover, the EU was a staunch supporter of Russia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession (completed in 2012).

EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine (updated Oct. 2022)

Joint communication on EU-Russia relations

EU restrictive measures in response to crisis in Ukraine (updated Feb. 2021)

Infographics: Illegal annexation of Crimea (Feb. 2021)

International Cooperation

Modern day challenges are common challenges and can best be approached through a sense of joint responsibility and understanding. The EU works in close cooperation with its partners in international fora. Broad range of foreign policy questions, including security, are best approached through cooperation.

Until the recent years, both the EU and Russia had a long record of cooperation on issues of bilateral and international concern including climate change, migration, drugs trafficking, trafficking of human beings, organised crime, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and the Middle East peace process.

Human Rights

The EU regards the full respect of human rights as vital to the long-term social and political stability of any country.

The EU is committed to promoting human rights and the rule of law in Russia in a sustained and constructive manner.

EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and Democratisation

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

In many countries around the world non-governmental actors are working with dedication and bravery, often in difficult conditions, to help ensure the effective protection of human rights and the advancement of democracy. Support to such organisations is a priority for the European Union.

The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was created by the European Parliament in 1994 to support both the activities of civil society working for human rights and democracy and the efforts of international organisations. It was renamed the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in December 2006.

The EIDHR has the following objectives:

1. support to human rights and human rights defenders in situations where they are most at risk;
2. support to other EU human rights priorities with main focus on protecting human dignity;
3. support to democracy;
4. support to EU Election Observation Missions;
5. support to international and regional human rights instruments and mechanisms.

How EIDHR projects are selected?

The projects are selected on the results of local, regional or global (worldwide) calls for proposals. The complete information of the calls is published on the following website of the European Commission. On this website anyone can find Guidelines for applicants for each EIDHR call for proposals. The Guidelines set out thematic priorities, specific modalities and other conditions of the calls. The selection is based on objective and transparent criteria, which are also indicated in this document.

In 2021, Russia was the fifth largest partner for EU exports of goods (4.1 %) and the third largest partner for EU imports of goods (7.5 %).

Economic and trade relations between Russia and the European Union are governed by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It was assumed that this agreement would find its development in a new agreement between the EU and Russia, aimed at the comprehensive development of bilateral relations. The new agreement was supposed to be based on the WTO rules and include stable and balanced rules aimed at the development of trade and investment relations. However, due to the 2014 crisis, the project was suspended and is now deeply frozen in the context of the illegal and unjustified aggression of Ukraine.

The above statistics show that trade flows between Russia and the EU are unbalanced. Russia exports mineral raw materials, metallurgical products of a low degree of processing. Moreover, the main Russian suppliers are a small number of major large businesses. EU exports are much more diversified. Of course the implementation of EU sanctions and Russian counter measures totally turned this situation upside down.

Agriculture

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has significantly disturbed global agricultural markets, particularly as Russia and Ukraine were major exporters of grains, wheat, maize, oilseeds (particularly sunflowers) and fertilisers. This has added further instability to markets, resulting in sharp price rises for key agricultural products and inputs.

In order to pressure Russia to stop the war, the EU adopted several sanctions. However, agricultural products from Russia are exempt from sanctions.

EU sanctions cover only bilateral trade between the EU and Russia, not international trade. EU sanctions have no extra-territorial effect. Third country persons and firms can import agrifood from Russia under EU sanctions. EU’s sanctions excluded a limited number of Russian banks from the SWIFT network. Banking relations via SWIFT can still continue via the other Russian banks. EU sanctions do not prohibit EU businesses to purchase, import or pay for Russian agricultural products, provided that sanctioned persons are not involved. The EU has carefully avoided a direct and comprehensive ban on the import of Russian agricultural products and fertilisers.

When restricted services are necessary for importing agricultural products from Russia, EU sanctions provide for specific exceptions.

EU Member States can authorise Russian-flagged vessels access to EU ports and Russian road transport undertakings to operate in the EU if that is for trade in agricultural or food products, including wheat and fertilisers. Public financing or financial assistance for trade by EU companies in the Russian agri-sector is also possible.

EU sanctions also envisage several exceptions for humanitarian purposes. EU Member States can authorise overfly of their airspace by Russian aircraft if that is required for humanitarian purposes.

EU Member States are also authorised to grant access to EU ports of Russian flagged-vessels, as well as entry to the EU of Russian road carriers for the purposes of importing or transporting agricultural products, including fertilizers and wheat, that are not subject to restrictions.

Agricultural products and food, including herbicides, fertilisers and agricultural machineries, can be exported from the EU to Russia, provided that no listed persons are involved.

Health

The EU showed international solidarity in the fight against the pandemic and its socio-economic impact. The EU allocated over €13 million to support vulnerable groups in Russia most affected by the pandemic. These include the elderly, women and children affected by domestic violence, people living with disabilities and migrants.

As well as short-term assistance, the EU’s funding went towards long-term support to help Russian society recover from the COVID-19 crisis, generate income in disadvantaged communities and increase employment opportunities in the regions.

In Russia, the COVID-19 pandemic once again reinforced a world view in which supranational formations like the EU have no place. The message that the Russian authorities and state-controlled media have been delivering is that authoritarian great powers like China and Russia have responded more effectively to the virus than the West. Western democracies, and above all the United States, have failed, and exposed the weaknesses of their political systems and irreparable fault lines in their societies. On top of all that, the EU institutions in Brussels have proven incapable of handling the pandemic or preventing EU member states from pursuing self-interested policies.

It is true that COVID-related developments in the EU have been far more exposed to both national and international public scrutiny. Such is the logical consequence of the greater transparency of democratic political systems. No comparable openness existed or exists with regard to the coronavirus situation in Russia. While huge efforts have been put into the mobilisation of the health care system, independent investigations suggest that infection and death statistics have been heavily manipulated, particularly in the Russian regions.

Russia clearly missed an opportunity with the vaccine Sputnik V, which would have deserved to become one of the key fighting tool against COVID-19 worldwide but also inside Russia where the population largely remained opposed to active immunisation. But premature and contrary proclamations of success with regard to Russia’s vaccine underpinned the impression of politicisation. Independent media, activists, and health workers faced severe punishment for the spreading of “fake news” about the pandemic.

Regardless, Moscow insists that Russia has fared much better in the pandemic than Western democracies. It sees itself in a position of relative strength that other international actors need to acknowledge. In Brussels and other EU capitals, on the other hand, the portrayal of the situation in the EU by the Russian authorities and media was perceived as yet another attempt to undermine and destabilise. So instead of jointly addressing a common threat, the sides drifted apart even faster.

Cooperation on health issues in such a context remains very limited. The latest major joint event was the healthcare conference of November 2020.

Climate change and environment

Climate change and the environment are areas of tremendous significance both to the EU and Russia.

Both the EU and Russia are Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Paris Agreement entered into force for both of them (after the EU ratified the agreement in October 2016 and Russia “accepted” it in September 2019). The Paris Agreement is the first-ever universal, global agreement aiming at avoiding dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in November 2022 marked the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The world has come a long way in the fight against climate change and its negative impacts on our planet; we are now able to better understand the science behind climate change, better assess its impacts, and better develop tools to address its causes and consequences. We now have a much clearer understanding of the extent of the potential climate crisis and what needs to be done to address it effectively. The science is there and clearly shows the urgency with which we must act regarding rapidly reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, taking necessary steps to assist those in need of support to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change, and finding the appropriate formula that would ensure the availability of requisite means of implementation that are indispensable for developing countries in making their contributions to this global effort, especially in the midst of the successive international crises, including the ongoing food security crisis exacerbated by climate change, desertification and water scarcity, especially in Africa that suffers the most impacts. In 2015, the world came together and showed the will to make the necessary compromises which led to the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement. We must seize opportunities for transformation towards sustainability by collectively thinking creatively and demonstrating the necessary political will. In November 2020, President Putin signed a decree ordering the Government “to ensure by 2030 the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 70 percent compared to the 1990 level”. This became Russia’s “Nationally Determined Contribution” (NDC) as part of the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

In December 2019, Russia adopted a national plan to adapt to climate change until the end of 2022. Moreover, a long-term low carbon development strategy and a law on the limitation of GHG emissions will soon see the light of day. The law will introduce mandatory reporting for the largest emitters of GHG.

With 5% of global greenhouse gases emissions, Russia is the world's fifth largest emitter country after China, the US, the EU and India. The levels of its emissions per capita and emission intensity are high. While it is one of the largest producers of gas, oil and coal, and still has a poor record on energy efficiency, it is also the world's largest forest country. Due to Russia’s location as a neighbour of the EU, its climate policies, beyond a global impact, have also a direct impact on the EU due to the risk of carbon leakage and competition distortion in the trade of energy and goods.

Russia boasts huge areas undisturbed by man and holds over 20% of the Earth's water resources and forests. But while Russia is home to unique natural resources, it also suffers from a number of environmental problems, some a legacy of the Soviet past, some brought about by more recent economic growth, with threats to biodiversity, deforestation and illegal logging, water, air and soil pollution ranking among the most serious ones.

Given long common land and sea borders, interconnected biosystems and shared risks, environmental problems can and should be addressed together. The need for joint action, together with the rest of international community, is even more pronounced in the area of climate change and global warming.

The war in Ukraine, in addition to create massive environmental damage on the battlefield, also led to a decrease in the priority given to environmental and climate issues.

Energy

The world is in the middle of a global energy crisis of unprecedented depth and complexity. Europe is at the centre of this crisis, which is having major implications for markets, policies and economies worldwide. The strains did not begin with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but they have been sharply exacerbated by it. Extraordinarily high prices are sparking a reappraisal of energy policies and priorities. The Europe-Russia energy relationship lies in tatters, calling into question the viability of decades of fossil fuel infrastructure and investment decisions built on this foundation. A profound reorientation of international energy trade is underway, bringing new market risks even as it addresses longstanding vulnerabilities.

Many of the contours of this new world are not yet fully defined, but there is no going back to the way things were. And we know from past energy crises that the process of adjustment is unlikely to be a smooth one. That adjustment will also be taking place in the context of commitments made by governments to clean energy transitions.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February has had far‐ reaching impacts on the global energy system, disrupting supply and demand patterns and fracturing long‐standing trading relationships. The combination of the COVID pandemic and the current energy crisis means that 70 million people who recently gained access to electricity will likely lose the ability to afford that access – and 100 million people may no longer be able to cook with clean fuels, returning to unhealthy and unsafe means of cooking. That is a global tragedy. And it is not only an energy crisis with which we are dealing: many countries also face a food security crisis and increasingly visible impacts of climate change.

There is a mistaken idea that this is somehow a clean energy crisis. That is simply not true. The world is struggling with too little clean energy, not too much. Faster clean energy transitions would have helped to moderate the impact of this crisis, and they represent the best way out of it. When people misleadingly blame climate and clean energy for today’s crisis, what they are doing – whether they mean to or not – is shifting attention away from the real cause: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Another mistaken idea is that today’s crisis is a huge setback for efforts to tackle climate change. In fact, this can be a historic turning point towards a cleaner and more secure energy system thanks to the unprecedented response from governments around the world.

At the same time, today’s major global energy and climate challenges increase the risk of geopolitical fractures and new international dividing lines – especially between advanced economies and many emerging and developing economies. Unity and solidarity need to be the hallmarks of our response to today’s crisis. That is the case for Europe during what promise to be tough winters not only this year but also next. And it is true globally.

Successful energy transitions must be fair and inclusive, offering a helping hand to those in need and ensuring the benefits of the new energy economy are shared widely. Even as countries struggle to manage the brutal shocks from the crisis, the last thing we should do is turn inwards and away from supporting each other. Instead, we need to work together to build trust.

Further cooperation with Russia in the Home Affairs area was affected by the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian destabilisation of eastern Ukraine (2014), which led to the introduction of sanctions against Russia. Meetings at ministerial and senior officials levels and all negotiations on possible new home affairs agreements, namely on visa liberalisation, upgraded Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA), Europol and Eurojust (agreements on operational cooperation), were suspended. Following the Russian military invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022), any ongoing or planned bilateral engagement with representatives of Russia has been suspended, including at technical/expert level.

Education

Over 1.4 million students from around the world come to Europe every year for higher education studies. With thousands of world-class universities, research centres and higher education institutions, Europe offers so much choice. There are opportunities of Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree and PhD/Doctoral programmes and also short-term exchange programmes so that students can choose the experience that suits them best.

Erasmus+, the EU's programme to support education, training, youth and sport, offers a variety of mobility and cooperation opportunities, including in the area of higher education.

Before February 2022, Russia was among the leading non-EU participant countries in Erasmus+ actively participating in all the streams of the programme, both at the level of universities and at the level of individual students. Among Erasmus+ Partner Countries, Russia had the highest number of mobility opportunities under the programme that allowed yearly some 4,000 students and academic staff members to study, teach and train in the EU and Russia.

Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Union has terminated the participation of Russian legal entities with over 50 % public ownership or public control in the Erasmus+ programme. Russian students, however, continue to have an opportunity to take part in Individual Credit Mobility and Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters (EMJM) schemes. To learn more about available opportunities under the Erasmus+ programme, click here.

Science and technology

One of the most established forms of EU-Russia S&T cooperation was the participation of Russian scientists in the EU's Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation, where Russia had traditionally been one of the most active and successful international cooperation partner countries.

During the period 2014-2020, the EU's Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 'Horizon 2020' was the main instrument of cooperation in the areas of research and innovation at the EU level. Horizon 2020 aimed to foster innovation through collaboration, bringing together researchers, innovators and industry from the European Union and beyond. The programme was open to everyone from everywhere, including from Russia.

Russian organisations had been involved in over 130 Horizon 2020 research and innovation projects jointly with their European partners. One of the outstanding examples of such cooperation is the CARE project. Please check the presentation of   project's results. 

Starting from 2021, the Horizon 2020 programme is succeeded by the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Programme, which will run until 2027.

Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Union has terminated the participation of Russian legal entities with over 50 % public ownership or public control in the EU Research & Innovation Programmes ‘Horizon 2020’ and ‘Horizon Europe’. Individual scholarships under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions mobility programme and individual grants of the European Research Council remain available to Russian researchers.

To learn more about available opportunities under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions mobility programme, click here.

To learn more about opportunities provided by the European Research Council, click here.