Preamble

1. We, the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, are strongly dedicated to upholding the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and to strengthening efforts to promote international peace and security. We are confronted with pressing and unprecedented challenges that threaten global security and stability, which require renewed efforts and unwavering determination. While the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes have been increasingly subjected to exceptional stress, with repeated use of chemical weapons, evolving biological threats, illicit trafficking of conventional weapons, and irresponsible rhetoric surrounding nuclear weapons, the G7 remains firmly committed to working together, including through the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and with other partners, to defend and preserve these regimes.

2. We reaffirm our steadfast solidarity with the Ukrainian people and our resolute support to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders. We reiterate our forceful condemnation of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia’s ongoing war is a blatant violation of international law, in particular the UN Charter, with severe consequences for international security, as well as for global arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts. We underscore the importance of the 78-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and its announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus are dangerous and unacceptable. Threats by Russia of nuclear weapons use, let alone any use of nuclear weapons use by Russia, in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine are inadmissible. Its unlawful seizure, continued control of, and alarming conduct at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) are unacceptable and constitute a flagrant betrayal of the principles underpinning decades of concerted efforts toward nuclear safety and security. We resolutely call on Russia to recommit, in word and deed, to the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races which affirmed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Our security policies are based on the understanding that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war and coercion. We reiterate that any use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons by Russia in Ukraine would be met with severe consequences.

Preserving nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament

3. We believe that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We call on those States that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT, renewing our support for its full universalization. Achieving a successful NPT Review Conference of State Parties in 2026 stands as a top priority for the G7 and we commit to pursue the broadest possible consensus on measures to reinforce the NPT regime. We reaffirm the unequivocal commitment to the full implementation of the Treaty and its three mutually reinforcing pillars (non proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology). Furthermore, we are strongly committed to promoting dialogue and cooperation among NPT Parties, and welcome diplomatic pathways that offer possibilities for advancing the goals of the NPT. To this end, we call on all NPT Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. We acknowledge the special responsibility of nuclear weapon States to pursue such negotiations.

4. Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, and the unprecedented devastation and immense human suffering the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki experienced as a result of the atomic bombings of 1945, we reiterate our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach. For this reason, the overall decline in global nuclear arsenals achieved since the end of the Cold War must continue and not be reversed.

5. While maintaining our strong support for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System, we underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all States that have not yet done so, to declare and maintain moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. In this regard, we deeply regret Russia’s decision to revoke its ratification of the Treaty and, expressing our grave concern regarding Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing, we call on Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests and to renew its ratification of the CTBT. We also call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to conduct any further nuclear tests, and to sign and ratify the CTBT. The G7 reaffirms its commitment to supporting with necessary resources the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification regime, and calls on the international community to do the same.

6. The G7 remains committed to, and underlines the importance of, the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), based on Document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. In the context of the continuing rapid and significant expansion of the nuclear weapon stockpiles of certain States, we remain convinced that such an instrument would represent a significant practical contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We also call on China, as the only NPT nuclear-weapon State not to have done so, to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use, to address ongoing proliferation crises and to strengthen arms control. In this regard, we also welcome efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to pursue effective measures, such as strategic risk reduction, confidence building measures and transparency on their nuclear doctrines, policies and capabilities, which are critical to making progress towards disarmament consistent with the NPT. We emphasize the importance of increasing predictability through enhanced transparency over nuclear forces, doctrines, and delivery systems. We call on Russia and China to provide data on their nuclear forces, test sites, and the objective size of their arsenals, following the efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

8. Maintaining existing crisis prevention and management tools, and establishing new ones, promoting confidence building measures and strategic stability dialogues, and recommitting to arms control treaties and efforts is paramount. In this regard, we reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full compliance and to engage the United States in good faith on reducing nuclear risks. We reiterate our concern about China’s opaque and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction with the U.S. to promote stability, including through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities. The G7 sees the need for arms control to address all nuclear weapons, including new destabilizing weapon systems and non-strategic weapons.

9. Among ongoing efforts to strengthen arms control is the work done by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. As we celebrate the Partnership’s tenth anniversary in 2024, we can reflect on the comprehensive body of work done to build international capacity and understanding applicable to future nuclear disarmament efforts. The development of realistic processes and technologies by the IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions that build confidence in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

Nuclear safeguards, safety and security

10. Recalling our full support for the professional and impartial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we underscore the Agency’s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology to the benefit of all Member States. The G7 supports the universal adoption of key safeguards agreements including Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and, where applicable, the revised Small Quantities Protocol (SQP). We will promote a reliable and responsible nuclear supply chain, in accordance with the highest standards of nuclear nonproliferation, including the application of the AP. We support further discussions within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) towards the establishment of the AP as a condition of supply for nuclear exports or nuclear-related exports for peaceful purposes.

11. The G7 reiterates its grave concern over Russia’s actions at Ukraine’s ZNPP, which endanger the population of Ukraine, neighbouring States, and the international community as a whole, and which highlight the need to ensure safety and security of nuclear facilities in armed conflicts. In this regard, we reaffirm our support to the IAEA’s efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, including through the establishment of a continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. We continue to call on Russia to fully respect the IAEA Director General’s “Seven Pillars on Nuclear Safety and Security” as well as the Five Concrete Principles established by the IAEA in response to the difficult conditions assessed at ZNPP. We call on Russia to ultimately and unconditionally withdraw its military and civilian personnel from the plant and from all of Ukraine, to return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities as the rightful owner, and to refrain from taking any actions that could result in a nuclear incident at the plant.

12. The recent international developments coupled with terrorist threats, also compel the international community to remain vigilant against the threat of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors. The G7 commits itself to promoting full implementation by all States of the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards consistent with IAEA standards and guidance. We also commit to contributing to the success of the 2024 IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS2024): Shaping the Future. This event will be a significant opportunity to raise awareness and strengthen nuclear security globally. Furthermore, the G7 calls on all States that have not yet done so to become parties to and fully implement key instruments related to nuclear security such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment. The G7 emphasizes the importance of annual reporting by all relevant States, including China, on their holdings of civil plutonium in a verifiable manner consistent with the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC549). The G7 also encourages further political commitments and implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance documents.

13. Strengthening nuclear safety, security and safeguards is essential to facilitate the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology consistent with the NPT, as a way to promote development and prosperity and to address the UN Sustainable Development Goals. We support the IAEA in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technology by all countries, in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner and, in this regard, we welcome the contributions of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. We also take note of the first Nuclear Energy Summit organized by the IAEA, together with Belgium, in March 2024. We underline that the deployment of next-generation nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors, should respect the highest nuclear safety, security and safeguards standards and guidance. We also welcome the establishment of the World Fusion Energy Group, a dedicated community, working in unison to accelerate research and development for the peaceful, safe and sustainable deployment of fusion energy.

14. The G7 welcomes Japan’s safe, science-based and responsible approach to the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which the IAEA has concluded is consistent with relevant international safety standards. The G7 acknowledges the monitoring activities by Japan, with results consistently demonstrating that the levels of nuclides, including tritium, in seawater and marine products are significantly below the international recognized standards. Also, the G7 supports the IAEA’s ongoing independent and transparent reviews, as well as its monitoring and assessment, providing further confidence in the safety of the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

15. We recall the G7 Leaders commitment in 2022 under the German Presidency at Schloss Elmau to further reduce reliance on civil nuclear and related goods from Russia, including working to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. To help advance this critical effort, the NPDG recalls the decision by G7 Climate, Energy, and Environment Ministers in April 2023 under the Japanese Presidency to establish a working group to explore further cooperation, which had its inaugural meeting in December 2023, co-chaired by the United States. We will continue to deepen such efforts by G7 and its partners, to diversify nuclear energy supply chains, facilitate the development of alternatives free from threats, coercion, and weaponization of energy supplies, and ultimately identify safe, secure and reliable cooperation on nuclear energy, taking into account, for those countries that choose to use it, the role of nuclear energy in supporting critical energy security and decarbonization goals, while other countries choose non-nuclear options to achieve the same goals.

Biological and chemical weapons

16. The G7 reaffirms its strongest commitment to effective multilateral actions against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. As such, we continue to stress the centrality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the importance of ensuring their full and effective implementation and universalization.

17. We welcome the constructive approach the majority of States Parties are taking to the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC established by the Ninth Review Conference chaired by Ambassador Leonardo Bencini of Italy. We welcome the commitment to examining concrete measures to strengthen the Convention in all its aspects and build cross-regional consensus towards progress as early as 2025. We are pleased with the increased submission by States Parties of the annual confidence-building measures reports and urge all States Parties to submit their reports timely, with the aim of ensuring universal transparency in the implementation of the Convention.

18. We are committed to strengthening the BTWC and we recognize the increasing importance of addressing biological threats worldwide. It is imperative to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. In this regard, we commit ourselves to developing a biosafety and biosecurity framework for actions to increase multilevel and multi-sectoral engagement with international organizations, academia, and the private sector to identify and promote stronger biosafety and biosecurity tools and measures for the life sciences and global health, strengthen national oversight, transparency, and risk mitigation measures for life sciences research and seek increased resources to support sound biosafety and biosecurity measures. The G7 will work to promote biosafety and biosecurity norms and practices in cooperation with partners and the international community, including through existing global health, science and technology, and non-proliferation forums, including the Global Partnership’s Biological Security Working Group. Supporting biological risk prevention is a priority, including in Africa: we recognise and commend the important contributions being made through the Global Partnership’s Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA). We deem it paramount to build on the SIMBA’s success and continue to strengthen preparedness and empower the African scientific community, starting with women and youth.

19. We acknowledge the transformative potential of biotechnology, in conjunction with other disciplines such as AI, in addressing global challenges and driving sustainable development. We affirm our commitment to fostering innovation, ensuring ethical practices, and promoting responsible stewardship of biotechnological advancements for the benefit of humanity and the environment while recognizing the importance of transparency and other frameworks to maximize positive impacts and addressing potential risks and equitable access to benefits.

20. We emphasize that any use or threat of use of biological or chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable, and that those responsible for the use of such weapons should be held accountable. We strongly support the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons as the only established international mechanism mandated to investigate allegations of deliberate use of biological weapons, and welcome the continued efforts of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, with support from UN Member States, to ensure that the mechanism is properly resourced, equipped, and operationalized to conduct effective investigations when needed.

21. We reaffirm our steadfast support to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its work to uphold the absolute ban on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons. We applaud the professionalism and integrity of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and congratulate the OPCW on the destruction of all declared stockpiles of chemical weapons in 2023. We deplore Russia’s attempts to hamper the OPCW’s vital work through baseless attacks and the continuing Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns, founded on the propagation of falsehoods against other States, including Ukraine. This represents a consistent pattern of Russian government’s behaviour designed to obscure facts and deflect responsibility.

22. We express our deepest condolences to Aleksey Navalny’s family, and we call on the Russian government to fully clarify the circumstances of his death. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in March 2018 and Aleksey Navalny in August 2020 with chemical nerve-agents of the “Novichok” group. We recall the questions asked on 5 October 2021 by 45 States Parties, including all G7 members, to Russia under Article IX of the CWC, and once again urge Russia to provide substantive answers to these questions. We support the statement made by 56 States Parties at the November 2021 CWC Conference of the States Parties, calling on Russia to account for the use of a chemical weapon on its territory. We urge Russian authorities to investigate and credibly explain the use of a chemical weapon on its soil taking into consideration Russia’s obligations under the CWC.

23. We express our deepest concerns regarding the reported use of riot control agents (RCAs), and possibly other chemicals, on the battlefield in Ukraine by Russian armed forces. Use of riot control agents against Ukrainian forces has been extensively reported in the press, including by Russian state-controlled media. We underscore that Article I of the CWC explicitly prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. We reiterate the request submitted under Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Convention in the name of all G7 members and other states to the Executive Council of the OPCW to assist in clarifying the situation related to the reported repeated use of these agents in combat operations. We regret that Russia did not provide convincing clarification of the matter and urge Russia to clarify the situation pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 2 of the Convention. We remain committed to providing Ukraine with what it needs to defend itself, including defense against chemical attacks.

24. We express our gravest concern over the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons in violation of the CWC. Independent internationally-mandated investigations have found the Syrian regime responsible for nine chemical weapons attacks since Syria acceded to the CWC in 2013. We are also concerned at the continued failure of the Syrian regime to cooperate with the OPCW, in violation of its obligations under the CWC and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2118. We emphasize that the continuing discrepancies, gaps and inconsistencies in Syria’s initial declaration are alarming. We urge Syria to comply with its obligations under the CWC and relevant UNSCRs and to immediately and completely declare and eliminate its chemical weapons program.

25. We welcome the decision by the Conference of the States Parties at its Twenty-Eighth session entitled “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use” on additional measures related to, inter alia, transfers of scheduled chemicals, their pre[1]cursors and equipment to Syria and we call on all States Parties to cooperate in implementing this decision. We furthermore welcome the publication of the fourth report issued by the Investigation and Identification Team that identifies ISIL as perpetrators of a chemical[1]weapons attack in Marea in 2015. This underlines the serious threat posed by terrorist groups and non-state actors. The G7 reaffirms its commitment to holding to account those responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria and beyond.

Regional threats

26. We express our grave concern over Iran’s continued destabilizing activities in and around the Middle East, including through its support to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other non-state actors, and through its development of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs, and the transferring of missiles and related technology, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other weaponry. We urge Tehran to use its influence over those groups, instead, to de-escalate regional tensions. We also call upon Iran to cease supplying advanced conventional weapons to state and non-state actors. In this regard, we strongly condemn Iran’s support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, inter alia by supplying UAVs, which are used in relentless attacks impacting the civilian population. Iran must refrain from providing missiles to Russia, which would amount to an unacceptable escalation. Were Iran to proceed with providing ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia, we are prepared to respond swiftly and in a coordinated manner including with new and significant measures against Iran. We remain committed to applying catch-all controls to address the growing challenges posed by the diversion of dual-use material and technology critical for weapons and their development, including UAVs which are extensively used by Russia in its war against Ukraine and by others elsewhere.

27. The G7 remains determined that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon and that a diplomatic solution, is the best way to resolve international concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has continued manufacturing, installing and operating thousands of advanced centrifuges, well in excess of JCPoA limits and with irreversible knowledge gains. It has continuously accumulated high enriched uranium for which it has no credible civilian justification while undermining the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities as reported in the framework provided by UNSCR 2231. Recent public statements made in Iran regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons are extremely concerning and raise questions about Iran’s commitment to fulfilling its legal obligations under the NPT. We call on Iran to immediately reverse the continued expansion of its nuclear activities, and to fulfil, without further delay, its legal obligations and political commitments in the field of non-proliferation.

28. We express profound concern that Iran still has not provided technically credible answers to the Agency relating to the outstanding safeguards issues, despite repeated calls and the adoption of three resolutions on this issue by the IAEA Board of Governors since 2020. We urge Iran to uphold and fully implement all obligations under its NPT required safeguards agreement and to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Iran must provide all the necessary technically credible information and access to any locations and materials deemed necessary by the Agency in order to effectively clarify and resolve all the outstanding safeguards issues without further delay. This includes taking the essential and urgent actions specified in the resolution the IAEA Board of Governors adopted in November 2022. If Iran fails to implement these actions, the Board must be prepared to take appropriate actions to hold Iran accountable. We also urge Iran to reverse the de[1]designations of experienced IAEA inspectors, which significantly affects the Agency’s ability to conduct effectively its inspections in Iran.

29. The G7 strongly condemns the DPRK’s ongoing development of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ballistic missiles, including through space launches using ballistic missile technology, which are all in blatant violation of multiple UNSCRs, and pose an increasingly serious threat to international security. Pyongyang’s escalatory nuclear doctrine is a source of grave concern, including its dangerous rhetoric surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate that these reckless actions cannot and will never confer upon the DPRK the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT or any special status of any kind. Any further nuclear test will be met with a swift, firm response from G7 States. The G7 reiterates its commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programmes, any other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in accordance with all relevant UNSCRs. We strongly urge the DPRK to cease any further escalation, abide by relevant UNSCRs, and to return to, and fully comply with, the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We call on the DPRK to accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by all parties concerned, including Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States.

30. We urge all UN Member States to fully and effectively implement all relevant UNSCRs and demand UNSC members to follow through on their commitments. In this context, we stress the critical role of the 1718 Committee and its Panel of Experts and we strongly condemn the use of a veto by Russia in the UNSC blocking the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts. We reiterate our commitments to countering the DPRK’s sanction[1]evading activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers. We are seriously concerned about DPRK’s cryptocurrency theft and money laundering as well as the earning by DPRK’s overseas IT workers and laborers of income that funds its affiliated forces and unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programmes. Furthermore, we reiterate our serious concern about the increasing military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, and strongly condemn the DPRK’s export and Russia’s procurement of DPRK’s ballistic missiles and other arms and related material for the use in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly violate relevant UNSCRs. We urge the DPRK to cease from providing any assistance to Russia and to immediately halt any arms transfers. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology from Russia to DPRK.

31. We express deep concern about the Syrian regime’s continued noncompliance with its NPT[1]related IAEA safeguards agreement in connection with its construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour. We welcome IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s recent travel to Syria and we continue to call on the Syrian regime to take the opportunity of such engagement to cooperate fully and constructively with the IAEA to resolve outstanding safeguards questions related to the site.

Conventional weapons

32. The illicit transfers and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons, in particular of small arms and light weapons (SALW), constitute a serious concern for global security, as they help facilitate violence, conflicts, and human rights’ violations, disproportionately affecting marginalized groups such as women, girls, and LGBTQ+ individuals, particularly in those regions already grappling with political and social unrest. We are determined to prevent illicit transfers and address destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons and ammunitions, and to increase the safety and security of stockpiles, including by deploying our technical expertise, sharing best practices and adhering to multilateral export control regimes and the international instruments aiming at regulating conventional arms as well as preventing and fighting their illicit trade. In this context, we commit to contributing to a successful Fourth Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UN PoA). We underscore the importance of considering new technologies as appropriate and in context: the challenges they pose to established SALW control measures and the opportunities they present to strengthen UN PoA and its International Tracing Instrument implementation.

33. The G7 attaches the greatest priority to the universalization and full implementation of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects -the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocols. The CCW and its Protocols are key international humanitarian law instruments and deserve unquestionable support. In addition, we support the humanitarian aims of the Ottawa Convention. The G7 is committed to strengthening the protection of civilians from the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons particularly in populated areas, which can have a devastating impact and long-term humanitarian consequences. We urge all parties to armed conflict to fully respect their obligations under IHL, including when using explosive weapons in order to minimize civilian harm.

Emerging Technologies and Artificial Intelligence

34. The rapid development of emerging disruptive technologies poses multifaceted opportunities and threats that demand attention and careful consideration. As technologies such as artificial intelligence, including to enable autonomous functions and systems, and quantum computing, continue to evolve and mature, they will likely have a profound impact on the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament field. In this context, we are committed to balancing the benefits of these technologies and mitigating their risks. Recognizing that these technologies have a strong impact on the future of military operations, we seek to shape the global debate on their responsible military use, with a view to ensuring compliance with applicable international law, in particular international humanitarian law, taking into account humanitarian considerations. We commit ourselves to taking appropriate measures to ensure the responsible development, deployment, and use of military AI capabilities and welcome all actions that promote responsible behaviour, including the sharing of best practices and, where necessary, developing new international norms and measures. We support ongoing processes on responsible use of artificial intelligence and autonomy in the military domain, which can provide means for building a broad, cross-regional international consensus and encourage continued discussion regarding its adoption.

35. We encourage the participants in the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, held under the framework of the CCW, to strive towards fulfilling its mandate to “formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems” and to submit a report to the Seventh Review Conference of the CCW in 2026. The CCW is uniquely suited to holding these discussions given that the Convention is an international humanitarian law instrument and that the delegations of High Contracting Parties routinely include members with military, technical, and policy expertise.

Countering the proliferation of missiles and other critical technology

36. We remain gravely concerned by the accelerating proliferation of ballistic and other missile technologies including those relating to UAVs, which is a threat to regional and global security. Recalling the G7 NPDG “Initiative on Countering Illicit and/or Destabilizing Missile Activities” launched by the French Presidency in 2019, we remain engaged in countering all missile proliferation activities and strengthening missile governance. We reaffirm our commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and we call on all States to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and reiterate the importance of the fundamental principles underpinning ballistic missile non-proliferation in accordance with UNSCR 1540.

37. We strongly support the universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) as a transparency and confidence building measure that encourages responsible behaviour and restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and aims to curb and prevent proliferation of such ballistic missiles. The G7 calls on all countries, especially those that possess a large stockpile of missiles, continue developing missile technologies and are developing their own space rocket programmes to join the HCoC. We underline the importance of ensuring transparency in ballistic missile launches and space-launch vehicle testing, including through pre-launch notifications under the HCoC.

38. We underscore that export controls remain a key non-proliferation instrument in maintaining international security and stability and recognize the central role of multilateral export control regimes, which support States’ ability to transfer technology with confidence and safety. We commit to strengthening export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as may lead to a destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors. We reiterate our commitment to reviewing and revising our respective controls, including by coordinating our efforts and supporting work to update multilateral export control regime lists to keep pace with rapid technological developments. We will also cooperate and promote efforts to adapt controls on emerging technology, according to our respective legal frameworks, that safeguard international peace and security.

39. We reaffirm the importance of coordinated action to counter illicit transfer of intangible technology and in close cooperation with academia and business sectors in this regard. While promoting an environment in which science, technology and legitimate research collaboration can flourish, we are resolved to address the challenges posed by the misuse and illicit diversion of technology critical for the development of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and for advanced military technology programmes by state and non-state actors.

Global Partnership

40. We reaffirm the unique role of the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). For more than two decades, the now 31-member GP has been a driving force behind global efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to threats posed by the acquisition and use of CBRN weapons and related materials by States and terrorists alike. We commit ourselves to upholding the G7 leadership in the delivery of impactful WMD threat reduction programming, and to continue to adapt and evolve its capacity building and assistance efforts in response to the ever-changing landscape. We commend the GP’s new Countering WMD Disinformation Initiative and its increased focus on addressing threats posed by Artificial Intelligence and emerging and disruptive technologies, and the Information Sharing Initiative, expanding coordination with Ukraine beyond nuclear and radiological threats to also address chemical and biological threats.

41. The G7 acknowledges the twentieth anniversary of the inception of UNSCR 1540 and reaffirms its support for effective implementation of this resolution. Since its adoption 20 years ago, UNSCR 1540 has become a vital component of the global non-proliferation architecture. We encourage all States to fully implement the resolution and to offer support to States in need of assistance.

Outer Space

42. We remain fully committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects through the promotion of responsible space behaviours, international cooperation and transparency and confidence-building measures. The G7 believes that establishing norms, rules and principles for responsible space behaviours is a pragmatic way forward to enhance security, mitigate threats against space systems, and reduce the risks of misperception, miscalculation, and escalation. We reaffirm the imperative of compliance with the Outer Space Treaty, underscoring that Article III sets forth the obligations of States Parties to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance with international law, which includes the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, and we re-commit ourselves to engaging the international community to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for outer space.

43. We urge all States to refrain from aggressive rhetoric or actions in relation to outer space that can increase the risk of miscalculation or escalation, including destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests. Following on from UNGA resolution 77/41, we welcome national commitments not to conduct such tests, already made by 38 UN Member States, including all the G7 States, as a pragmatic and tangible step forward for enhanced security and sustainability in outer space and encourage others to follow suit. We reiterate the need to cooperate with all States and space actors to strengthen safety, security, stability, and sustainability of outer space and help all States benefit from the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space.

Gender perspectives

44. We commend all efforts aimed to integrate and enhance intersectional gender and diversity perspectives and considerations into disarmament and non-proliferation work, which can provide key insights into how women, men, boys and girls can be differentially impacted by armed conflict and weapons. We strongly advocate for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in negotiation processes and forums across the non-proliferation and disarmament machinery, such as but not limited to the NPT and BTWC review processes, the IAEA and the OPCW. We also reaffirm the importance of achieving not only gender equality around the negotiation table, but also in the delivery of services to those directly affected by weapons, such as conventional weapons, through the implementation of gender-responsive disarmament and arms control. Education and outreach

45. The G7 stresses the need to implement long-term solutions to ensure that knowledge in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament does not get lost and that the next generation of experts is well trained and provided with career opportunities. Through targeted actions, such as courses and trainings, we commit to encouraging young professionals to enter the field and mid-level professionals to further improve their skills. We actively support global efforts to enhance education and professional development and note the contribution of efforts such as the newly established International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, to continually engaging youth globally. We encourage leaders, youth and people from around the world to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to raise and sustain awareness of the realities of nuclear weapons use one can witness in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We are strongly committed to championing youth and gender equality and inclusion in this field. We commend initiatives dedicated to this goal, such as the Young Women Next Generation Initiative (YWNGI) established by the EU Non[1]Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium (EUNPDC), the Youth Leader Fund for a World without Nuclear Weapons funded by Japan, the P5 Young Professionals Network, the Black Sea and Central Asian Women in Nuclear Network groups and the U.S.-Black Sea Nonproliferation Professionals Exchange funded by the U.S., and other related initiatives. We also express our support for additional regional training and capacity building initiatives, including James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Visiting Fellows Program and schools/network in Latin America, and Africa. We also commend and support the critical training work of the Odesa Nonproliferation Center (OdCNP).