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Good evening, 

This week is going to be unavoidably a Ukrainian week.  

Today, the Foreign Affairs Council. Tomorrow, a meeting with the Secretary-General of NATO [Jens Stoltenberg], myself as High Representative, and Minister [for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro] Kuleba, at the NATO Headquarters to evaluate together the military situation and the actions to be taken. And, immediately after, to the United Nations and the vote at the General Assembly. 

So, both internationally [and] militarily, at the European institutions we continue paying attention to the war in Ukraine. And the previous week in Munich [at the Munich Security Conference], also. 

But today, we started the Council [meeting] with a minute of silence to pay tribute to the over 40,000 victims – the number continues increasing and we are already at about 40,000 victims – of the devastating earthquakes in Turkey and Syria.   

The priority of the European Union and its Member States is to help the hundreds of thousands of people affected in both countries without a shelter and all the needs we can provide, we are doing it. 

We have been responding quickly and with unwavering solidarity to the Turkish and Syrian people in these difficult times.  

After this minute of silence, we started discussing about Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It was one year ago. And we had a long and intense Foreign Affairs Council on that.  

One year. One year of daily deaths, destruction and crimes against humanity.  

I am sure that Putin was not thinking, when he unleashed the invasion of Ukraine, that one year later he and his army would be in the situation they are now [in]. 

But we could not imagine either the amount of suffering, destruction and death that the Ukrainian people are bearing since then. It has been, certainly, an awful year and the coming weeks will be crucial.  

This was the feeling at the Munich [Security] Conference. This has been the feeling at the Foreign Affairs Council today.  

The coming weeks, the coming Spring will be crucial. Russia is massing troops in the frontlines: 350,000 Russian soldiers, almost twice the number of soldiers that were there at the beginning of the war, [and there are] 50,000 artillery shots every day. 

Yes, certainly, Russia is unleashing another offensive and it will continue. 

We have to continue our strong, unwavering support to Ukraine, until Ukraine prevails and wins.  

For that, time is of essence. Speed means lives, and we need to respond quickly. Not only [to provide] more support but to provide it quicker. 

We have to continue delivering what is needed. We have tools. The European Peace Facility will continue funding and training the Ukrainian armed forces in the framework of our [EU Military] Training Mission (EUMAM Ukraine).  

But, as I said several times these last days, the Ukrainian army urgently needs large amounts of ammunition to counter Russia’s aggression. You may have a gun, but a gun needs a bullet – especially for tanks and artillery.  

We have to deliver. We have to move faster. Today, we discussed how to intensify our joint efforts. But this is a matter for the Ministers of Defence more than the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. I will present a concrete proposal to the Ministers of Defence in Stockholm on the next 7-8 March. 

It is evident that we have to launch procedures in order to increase the capacity of European industry to produce more and quicker. It is evident that we have to intensify our joint efforts, notably through possible procurements at the European level to address Ukraine’s urgent needs. 

But it is also clear that in the next weeks, the best way to provide ammunition to Ukraine is to share the already existing ammunition stockpiles of the European armies. We do not have to wait for them to be produced. You have to use what has already been produced and is stockpiled or has already been contracted and will be produced in the coming days. Priority has to be given to the supplies to the Ukrainian army - as much as we can.  

So, we have short-term objectives, medium-term and long-term [objectives]. But the important ones today are the short-term [objectives]. It does not mean that we do not have to think about how to provide more, quicker and better capacities through any kind of procedure, but my most important concern is to work on a time-scale of weeks. And a time-scale of weeks means to use what you have already produced, and to produce more in order to fill the gaps. 

All that has to be done in order to put more pressure on Russia. 

Today, we have been discussing the 10th package of sanctions that, as High-Representative and [with] the [European] Commission, together, we have presented as a regulation for the Council to approve. 

We are on the way to approving it, and I think it is going to be approved during the next hours, in the next days - before 24 [February], in any case. The 10^th package of sanctions will be approved by written procedure before 24 [February]. 

The obstacles that still remain will be overcome. This is the commitment of all Ministers [for Foreign Affairs]. There was strong support across the room for the package, and I insist, I am confident that we will be able to adopt it before the end of the week. In the end, it is the Council who approves the sanctions, and this requires unanimity.  

Let me [recall] that sanctions work, that we are impacting severely the Russian economy. Look at the public deficit. Look at the trade deficit. Look at the income coming from selling hydrocarbons. These three variables are in a very bad shape.  

Last year, it was a good year for Russia because they could sell a lot of hydrocarbons in a moment where the energy prices were rocketing, but this is over. We have gotten rid of our dependency on Russia’s hydrocarbons and the prices are going down. Russia is selling its oil at $40 a barrel – half the price of the Brent in international markets.  

So, have a look at these three parameters – trade, [public] deficit and income from hydrocarbons – and you will see how much the sanctions are affecting the Russian capacity to continue financing the war.  

We also discussed about how the work on [ensuring] full accountability is going. We discussed which is the appropriate mechanism to face these accountability procedures. 

We have this vote at the UN General Assembly this week. Together with Ukraine and our G7 partners, we are conducting an intense outreach in order to ensure a broad support for the Resolution on UN Charter principles being put to vote at the General Assembly.  

I will be, together with several colleagues, in New York.  

We all have been in Kyiv during this year. Today, President [of the United States, Joe] Biden is visiting our Ukrainian neighbours and friends. The visit of President Biden is a clear demonstration of our transatlantic unity and our resolve to continue supporting Ukraine together. 

My meeting tomorrow with the Secretary General of NATO [Jens Stoltenberg] and Minister [for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro] Kuleba is also a prove of this transatlantic unity. 

This war happens on European soil, but it has a global impact. This war has been sending shockwaves to the whole world, creating a lot of trouble on energy and food markets, increasing prices, provoking inflation, the reaction of the central banks, raising interest rates, creating downturns on economic growth. After the pandemic, the economies were recovering; the war has killed the recovery in many places.  

The Black Sea Grain Initiative - that was a relief of this food crisis - is expiring in mid-March, in a couple of weeks. And it needs to continue. All countries in the world must [put] pressure [on] Russia to allow its extension and remove its restrictions for agricultural export.  

We have been contributing through our EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, which have allowed and facilitated the export of 50 million tons of exports from Ukraine to the rest of the world and helping to stabilise global food prices.  But, this deal brokered by the United Nations and Turkey, has to be extended. Otherwise, we will have again a food crisis in the world.  

After discussing about Ukraine, we were glad to welcome the Moldovan Foreign Minister/Deputy Prime Minister, Nicu Popescu. We exchanged views about the direct consequences of the war, including the unacceptable repeated violations of Moldova’s airspace and Russia’s weaponisation of energy supply against Moldova. 

Moldova needs support. We are supporting Moldova. We will continue supporting Moldova on its European path. The enlargement process has today a completely different political meaning than before the war. Strengthening Moldova’s resilience and security is the best way to ensure that they will advance on the European path.  

Moldova, as Ukraine, belongs to the European family and its future lies within the European Union. Now, it is absolutely clear, and we have to build on it. 

Moldova expressed a clear wish to benefit from our Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). We will continue studying the possibility of such a [CSDP] mission in Moldova, which should support our candidate [country] in enhancing their resilience against foreign interference and destabilisation efforts. They are suffering a lot of destabilization attempts, and we have to help them to face the situation. 

We are supporting Moldova through the European Peace Facility and we will continue doing that. You know that in the last year, we allocated €40 million of the European Peace Facility to the Moldovan security forces. Also, in the case of Moldova, time is crucial, speed is of essence. 

And then, we went to discuss on the deplorable decision by the Taliban to stop Afghan women from working in aid delivery. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are creating a “gender apartheid”, and this “gender apartheid” is having a significant impact on aid operations in Afghanistan. 

We heard from the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed – who virtually connected with us – her impressions and feedback from her recent visit to Afghanistan.  

Ministers have agreed that our humanitarian and basic needs and livelihood assistance will continue but will continue and will be delivered in a non-discriminatory way. So they have to be in line with our principles and the principles agreed last week by the international humanitarian donors’ community. Under these principles, our support will continue because we do not want to punish twice the Afghan women. But this has to be closely monitored and decided on a case-by-case basis during a trial period.  

It is clear that we do not want to abandon Afghanistan, but we do not want to increase the suffering of the Afghan people – and in particular Afghan women – but we cannot remain silent in from of the Taliban’s decisions. 

They are fully accountable for their human rights violations. We will calibrate our assistance in a way, as I said, to [avoid] punishing twice Afghan women.  

This reflection on the future work will be captured in the Council Conclusions that the Ministers committed to agree at the next month’s [Foreign Affairs Council]. And in the meantime, use a six-month period in order to continue delivering assistance in full compliance with these principles. 

Then, we discussed about climate and energy.  

We need to double our efforts to make sure that COP28 delivers more than just a repetition of already existing ambitions.  

One year ago, four days before Russia launched its invasion, we approved our climate diplomacy. But four days after, the world changes. The Russian invasion has a big impact on the global energy market and clearly showed that there is a need for increased global action amongst the biggest emitters and strong support to our partners in the green transition.  

We know that the changing climate threat and environmental degradation have serious implications for peace and security. It is not just about raising temperatures; it is about global risks [to] peace and security. These are systematically affected by climate change, and we have to systematically incorporate and integrate [climate and energy] in our foreign and security policies.  

That is why, together with the Executive Vice-President [for the European Green Deal] Frans Timmermans, we will present a joint communication to the [European] Commission on these issues. The impact of climate change on security and foreign policy will be very high in our political agenda from now until the next COP28. 

We have to push for a pressing reform of the Multilateral Development Banks. This is a good opportunity for that. These kinds of changes only happen when there is a big crisis looming and, certainly, we need to increase climate finance beyond the level of traditional donors. The level of traditional donors is not enough: we need to reform the Multilateral Development Banks. 

I will meet [the] United Nations Secretary-General [António] Guterres in New York later this week, and this will be part of our meeting. We will discuss [also] this urgency, among other issues. 

And the final point of this long and intense Foreign Affairs Council - which opened the door for the 7-8 [March] Defence Council and afterwards the Jumbo between Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers - was about Iran. 

About Iran, we adopted today 34 additional listings under the Iran Human Rights Sanctions Regime. This is our fifth package of measures targeting those individuals responsible for very severe human rights violations and the situation of Iranian women, in particular.  

What is happening in Iran continues to be alarming. Yesterday, I had a conversation with the Iranian Foreign Minister [Hossein Amir-Abdollahian] in order to advance the decision that was going to be taken today by the Council and, also, to raise our concern about the news on the enrichment of uranium that has to be confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  

Thank you. 

Q&A 

Q. I would like to ask about Iran. Since yesterday, there are some reports suggesting that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors confirmed that Iran is reaching levels of 84%. Do you have this confirmation yourself? What could be the impact of that on the whole discussions with Iran on the JCPOA or on the cooperation level between Iran and the International [Atomic Energy] Agency in Vienna? And related to the relationship between Iran and the European Union, all the successive sanctions packages, where all this will lead Mr High Representative? To isolate Iran more and more or to – in the end – cut the relationship between the European Union and Iran totally? Because they are not listening to you, at least in the public discussions. They are continuing the repression. They are not coming back to the JCPOA. They are enriching more and more. Where all these talks block the JCPOA and plus the successive sanctions will lead the relationship between the European Union and Iran? 

I am going to answer in Spanish, my answer will be more accurate. These are sensitive questions, so I prefer to express myself better in Spanish. We have excellent interpreters, and I am sure it is a better way of being accurate for you to understand what I am going to say.  

Mire, los asuntos nucleares son asuntos complejos y sensibles. Eso de que “hay informes que dicen que posiblemente ha habido un enriquecimiento”, como usted dice, son informes cuya procedencia desconozco y cuya fiabilidad también. Y eso de enriquecer uranio es algo más complicado de lo que parece. El funcionamiento de las centrifugadoras es algo que, no quiero entrar en detalles tecnológicos, pero no es algo que se puede decir así alegremente. 

Y para eso tenemos un observador, la Agencia Internacional de la Energía Atómica, que tiene todas las capacidades técnicas para hacer el seguimiento de lo que pasa en el programa nuclear iraní, y es la que me tiene que decir qué pasa. Y se lo hemos pedido y nos va a contestar en el curso de esta semana. Y hasta que no tenga un informe de la Agencia Internacional de la Energía Atómica, no me voy a pronunciar. Sobre “alguien dice”, “qué pasa”, “quizás”, “algo”. Vamos a ver quién me dice lo que sabe, lo que pasa.  

Y sí, comprendo su pregunta. Mire, las sanciones no son solamente necesarias, son absolutamente inevitables. ¿Quiere eso decir que son suficientes? No, claro que no son suficientes. Si fuera tan fácil, muchos problemas estarían resueltos. Pero las sanciones tienen una dimensión política y una dimensión práctica. Y ciertamente, a Irán no le gusta que le apliquemos sanciones, pero no tenemos más remedio que hacerlo porque los acontecimientos que se han producido allí son los que son. 

Las negociaciones para el pacto nuclear ciertamente están en un punto de, digamos, letargo invernal. No es posible avanzar en este momento dado el entorno, el conjunto de circunstancias que han ocurrido. No tenemos ningún interés en empujar a Irán hacia una mayor complicidad o cooperación con Rusia, todo lo contrario. Pero es evidente que lo que ha ocurrido internamente en Irán y su contribución al esfuerzo militar ruso – aunque Irán lo sigue negando – ha paralizado un proceso de negociación que, en su esencia, ya antes del verano estaba en un punto muy maduro. Ahora está congelado, y vamos a ver qué ocurre. 

En mi llamada ayer con el ministro iraní [de Asuntos Exteriores, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian] le dije claramente que tienen que cesar su apoyo militar a Rusia – que, insisto, Irán niega –, pero creo que tenemos evidencia suficiente; que tienen que liberar a los binacionales iraníes de países europeos detenidos; y que tienen que cumplir con sus compromisos certificables por la Agencia Internacional de la Energía Atómica. 

Q. This morning, you said that China supplying lethal weapons – lethal aid - to Russia would be a red line in relations. But what would that mean if the red line were crossed? [You said] if it were to do so, it would be a red line. If that red line were crossed, how would the European Union respond? 

Yo no he dicho que China suministre armas a Rusia. No me ponga usted en el mismo nivel una afirmación que un condicional. Yo no he dicho que China esté suministrando armas: al contrario, he dicho que, en mis conversaciones con el consejero Wang Yi, cuando le planteé esta cuestión su respuesta fue clara, que es que China no lo estaba haciendo y no tenía intención de hacerlo. Esa es la realidad de mi respuesta de esta mañana.  

Lo quiero repetir: yo no he dicho que China esté suministrando armas. He dicho y digo que, al contrario, el State Councilor Wang Yi – a quien le planteé nuestra preocupación por esa posibilidad - me contestó de una forma muy concreta diciendo “no lo hacemos, no tenemos intención de hacerlo”. Lo cual no quiere decir que no tengamos que mantenernos vigilantes, que no tengamos que seguir de cerca qué es lo que está pasando.  

Si tal cosa ocurriera, esto sería, ciertamente, un acontecimiento estratégicamente importante. Voy a utilizar un lenguaje más acorde con la diplomacia. Sería un “substantive event”, un acontecimiento importante que, naturalmente, nos obligaría a hacer una evaluación de sus consecuencias. Pero, por el momento, tal cosa no se ha producido. 

Q. First, on the question of joint procurement. High Representative, I understand it was a general discussion, you said it is a matter above all of Defence Ministers. But can you give us a sense of where Member States stand on that issue based on your discussion so far? Is there a broad agreement or are there still reservations to overcome? Secondly, on climate: we were expecting to see language, text, conclusions today, we have not seen any. Can you explain what the problem is there? Thank you. 

Sí, yo también lo esperaba. Yo también esperaba que se hubieran podido resolver los pequeños problemas que todavía están pendientes de resolver. Creo que serán resueltos en las próximas horas. No vamos a tener que esperar al próximo Consejo [de Asuntos Exteriores]. En los próximos días, espero poder aprobar por procedimiento escrito estas conclusiones del Consejo que ustedes conocerán y que los obstáculos todavía pendientes de resolver serán resueltos.

Con respecto a la primera pregunta: sí, todos los Estados miembros han demostrado su voluntad de continuar apoyando a Ucrania, de suministrarle rápidamente lo que necesita y de buscar los procedimientos necesarios para hacerlo – “bajar de las musas al teatro”, como decimos. En principio, está muy bien; vamos a ponerlo en escena. Y eso, como digo, es más un tema de los ministros de Defensa que son los que compran municiones - las almacenan y las entregan para que se las entreguemos a Ucrania.  

Y les hemos explicado lo que ya expliqué en Múnich, creo que es importante tener claro. Si el problema es un problema de urgencia y el tiempo se mide en semanas – o, como mucho, en un par de meses - la solución para resolver la petición de urgencia tiene que venir de intentar utilizar lo que ya existe. Porque acudir a la industria a pedir que lo fabrique, por rápido que se haga, tiene una constante de tiempo superior a la que se mide en semanas.  

Y por eso, estoy en contacto con los ministros de Defensa, mañana con el secretario-general de la OTAN [Jens Stoltenberg], para plantearles la necesidad de que los contratos que ellos ya han pasado con la industria. Porque todos los Estados miembros han contratado ya con la industria. El problema es que el ritmo al que se consumen municiones es superior al ritmo al que se producen. Y eso es como un depósito de agua, ¿no? Si sale más de lo que entra, al final se acaba vaciando. Bien, pues es lo que está pasando. El depósito se está vaciando. Por lo tanto, hay que acelerar el flujo de entrada. Y eso quiere decir aumentar la capacidad de la industria, que tampoco se hace en semanas.  

Luego, tengan claro los distintos objetivos en distintos plazos de tiempo para hacer frente a distintos problemas. Suministrar municiones a Ucrania para poder hacer frente los combates que están teniendo lugar y los que van a tener lugar en las próximas semanas requiere que los Estados miembros den prioridad a Ucrania en el uso de sus capacidades actuales y las que ya han contratado con la industria. Para aumentar la capacidad de la industria, hacen falta actuaciones estructurales que hay que hacer de acuerdo y en cooperación con la Comisión [Europea]. Y para agilizar las producciones tenemos tanto en la Agencia Europea de la Defensa como en la Joint Procurement Task Force medios de hacerlo. La Agencia Europea de la Defensa ya tiene en marcha tres programas de compra común de municiones. Es cuestión de acelerar su apuesta en aplicación. 

Q. Je voulais revenir sur cette question, monsieur Borrell, parce que vous insistez sur l’urgence. On a l’impression qu‘aujourd’hui les ministres ont dit “oui” beaucoup - comme d'habitude, des déclarations. Il y a une proposition estonienne sur la table. Moi, je la comprends. Ils disent que les États membres mettent 4 milliards d'euros dans la Facilité européenne pour la paix pour acheter un million d'obus de 155 [millimètre]. Il faut combien de temps pour faire ça ? C'est une question d'argent s’ils ne veulent pas mettre la main à la poche? Et dans ce cas-là, est-ce que c'est utile, est ce que c'est nécessaire de jurer la main sur le cœur qu'on va aider l'Ukraine? Ça ne prend pas des mois de mettre 4 milliards [d’euros] sur la table, non? 

La European Peace Facility ya ha visto aumentada su capacidad financiera. Recientemente, ya ha habido un acuerdo para dotarla de más de 2.000 millones [de euros] adicionales. Por lo tanto, el problema inmediato no es la falta de capacidad financiera – porque estoy seguro de que si hace falta poner 2.000 millones [de euros] más, se pondrán. El problema es el método. El problema es quién contrata, con quién contrata, por qué procedimientos, y cómo llegan a Ucrania los contratos que le puedan ayudar.  

Es que ahora parece, cuando les oigo, como si nunca hubiésemos entregado municiones a Ucrania. Llevamos un año entregando municiones a Ucrania. Cuando la European Peace Facility ha gastado 3.6 billones de euros, buena parte de ese dinero ha servido para financiar municiones. Claro que sí. Es que parece como si estuviéramos inventando la rueda. Llevamos un año suministrando municiones a Ucrania. El problema es que la guerra ha cambiado de naturaleza.  

Ahora es una guerra de posiciones con duelos de artilleros que consumen mucha más munición que unos meses atrás, cuando era una guerra de movilidad donde la artillería fija tenía un papel menor. Rusia dispara hoy 50.000 balas de artillería cada día. Cada día, 50.000. No les voy a dar la cifra de Ucrania pero, ciertamente, es menor. Esta guerra de posiciones con duelos de artilleros requiere más munición. Entonces, lo que hay que hacer es lo que veníamos haciendo, pero más - más y, si es posible, más aprisa. Pero no vamos a inventar aquí la pólvora.  

Llevamos entregando municiones a Ucrania desde hace un año. Vamos a seguir haciéndolo: señores ministros de defensa, [tomen] sus stocks de munición [y] dinamícenlos para que sean utilizados en Ucrania; señores industriales, aumenten su capacidad. Todo ese diálogo no se resuelve en una tarde. 

Q. I have a question on the 10th package of sanctions. Can we expect diamonds to be included? And in which way will it be included? Because according to the Portuguese Foreign Minister [Augusto Santos Silva], it is going to be in the 10th package. We have seen Lithuania asking also for the sanctions to target the nuclear sector. Will it be in this package or it is going to be for the next one? 

Vamos a ver, lo siento, pero el décimo paquete de sanciones todavía no está aprobado. Y tenemos ustedes y yo que esperar a que se apruebe. Porque si ahora les digo yo qué está o no está, y luego no está. No está aprobado. Y cuando se apruebe, lo conocerán.  

Ya ha habido información sobre cuáles eran los aspectos más importantes de este paquete – que es básicamente electrónica, vehículos especializados, piezas de recambio para maquinaria, para camiones, para aviones, bienes para la construcción que pueden ser utilizados también para el esfuerzo militar de Rusia, tal como antenas o grúas. Restricción [también] de todos los bienes que puedan ser utilizados a la vez para un fin civil y un fin militar, básicamente bienes tecnológicos, básicamente componentes electrónicos, básicamente materiales raros, cámaras térmicas. Todo lo que puede ser utilizado para el campo de batalla. Si además se va a plantear [incluir] los diamantes pues, francamente, no lo sé. No hay sanciones que afecten al sector nuclear todavía. 

Q. High Representative, you said that [there is a] gender apartheid in Afghanistan, but as I know, the gender apartheid in Africa happened and the world sanctioned them, and the collapse happened. Why not with the Taliban? Because there is no solution, I think, for this Taliban regime. Also, the Pakistani Foreign Minister [Bilawal Bhutto Zardari] in Munich said that the world pays most attention to Ukraine and they forgot the threat of Taliban and terrorists in Afghanistan. What is your view on that?  

Mire, hace poco estuve en Sudáfrica. Visité el Museo del Apartheid y conocí mejor la dramática, cruel y terrible realidad que fue el régimen del apartheid en Sudáfrica - que duró muchos años, y la lucha para acabar con ese inhumano sistema también duró muchos años. Y, desde luego, hay que rendir homenaje a las personas que hicieron esa lucha y a todos los que pagaron con su vida la liberación de este sistema para millones de personas.  

En torno al “apartheid de género”, he utilizado esta figura porque creo que significa bien lo que está ocurriendo en Afganistán. Por el hecho de ser mujer – no por el color de su piel sino por su género – vive usted aparte, no tiene acceso a, no puede ir a, no puede compartir con. Eso es el apartheid, es un apartheid de género, sí, eso es lo que están construyendo los talibanes allí. Y nosotros luchamos contra eso por todos los medios que tenemos a nuestra disposición: las sanciones que hemos adoptado –  hemos adoptado muchas, adoptaremos más.  

Pero tenemos que tener cuidado con que el retirar ayuda que va a la población no signifique el doble castigo para la para la población - la que le infligen los talibanes y en la que le infligimos nosotros. Y, por eso, los ministros han pedido que la ayuda continúe si se cumplen determinadas condiciones. Por ejemplo, una ONG a la que los talibanes obliguen a sustituir trabajadoras por trabajadores, y expulsan a las trabajadoras de su actividad y las sustituyen por hombres, no podrá recibir nuestra ayuda. Está claro: los principios tienen que ser respetados. Pero si tal cosa [no] ocurre, si ese apartheid de género no se aplica, en ese caso – al menos durante 6 meses de prueba – seguiremos dando ayuda económica que beneficie directamente a los ciudadanos y a la gente de Afganistán, que están en una dramática situación de necesidad. 

Q. Today, we have the visit of the American President coming to Kyiv. How useful will that visit be to speed up the common efforts of the armament delivery to Ukraine? In particular, will it increase some kind of security confidence in the frontline EU states which of course are depleting their military stocks. In the framework of weapons procurement, do you consider some kind of possibility to place some kind of ammunitions directly in Ukraine? 

To describe the visit of President [of the United States, Joe] Biden to Ukraine it is much better to use English. In English, in Spanish, in French, whatever language I could use, it is very important to stress the visit of the United States’ President. It only shows the importance that the United States is giving to the Ukrainian fight. We celebrate this visit, because it is a way of showing that we are engaged – the US, the European Union, Canada, United Kingdom, and many other countries around the world are supporting the fight that Ukraine is waging against Russia’s invasion. I do not know if this visit will have such or such concrete deliverables but certainly it will increase the engagement of the US with the Ukrainian fighters. On the second question, why not, if there were industries in Ukraine it would be much better, we would save the transport fees. 

Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-237367