EU Statement at IAEA Board of Governors on Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), as delivered on 21 November 2024
Chair,
I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina[1], the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco, and San Marino align themselves with this statement.
The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report and DDG Aparo for the technical briefing. We commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work.
It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. We call on all countries to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the JCPOA, which provides the basis for the IAEA's monitoring and reporting. We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Iran’s unabated nuclear advances over the last five years are of utmost concern. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region is increasing as a result of Iran’s escalating nuclear trajectory. We note the expected continuation of exchanges between the Agency and Iran on the possibility of stopping the increase of stockpiles of uranium enriched up to 60%, including on necessary technical verification measures in this regard. At the same time, it should be clear to Iran that the international community needs more than reassuring words. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to address the issue.
The EU remains deeply concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has gravely departed from its JCPOA commitments and has gained irreversible knowledge. The EU notes with particular concern Iran’s considerable accumulation of high-enriched uranium and expansion of nuclear enrichment capability and operations, including through the installation of thousands of additional advanced centrifuges. The DG’s report documents again a sharp rise of material at 60%. All these actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions, since they have no credible civilian justification. In this context, the EU remains concerned by statements made by Iranian officials about Iran’s capacity to assemble a nuclear weapon.
Chair,
Iran has stopped the implementation of its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA. For more than three and a half years, the Agency has been unable to carry out several key JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities. Iran’s subsequent decision to have all of the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment removed, has further exacerbated the situation. The Agency has lost continuity of knowledge on the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium concentrate. Therefore, the Agency is unable to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We reiterate our grave concerns in this regard.
Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State to systematically produce and accumulate highly enriched uranium. This adds not only to the Agency’s concerns, as stressed in the report, but also to ours. In light of these multiple and grave concerns, we strongly urge Iran to reverse its alarming nuclear trajectory and return to its nuclear non-proliferation commitments without further delay. The EU expects Iran to complete the installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment and grant the Agency unhindered access to their data. We also urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, to ratify it, and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. This, together with full implementation of the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1, is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial. The EU wholly supports the IAEA's efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We reiterate our support for the Director General’s efforts in the pursuit of a constructive engagement with Iran to enhance cooperation and address issues that need to be urgently resolved. We unequivocally call on Iran to engage effectively with the IAEA without any further delay.
With this, we take note of the Director General's report and request that it be made public.
Thank you, Chair.
[1] North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.