We have given the title “Europe in the “arc of fire” to the yearbook dedicated to 2024 because the events we have had to face during the last several months have – unfortunately – confirmed the diagnosis made earlier: Europe is in danger.

Our geopolitical environment is deteriorating, and conflicts and crises are multiplying on our doorstep. From Ukraine to the Middle East via the South Caucasus, the Horn of Africa or the Sahel.

As for the two open conflicts raging on our borders, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, we struggled this year in making progress towards a just and lasting settlement.

As for the two open conflicts raging on our borders, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, we struggled this year in making progress towards a just and lasting settlement of each of them.

We have continued our financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine. We have now committed €122 billion for this purpose, including €45 billion in military support. We have also just decided to use the revenues from frozen Russian assets to guarantee this aid to Ukraine for the future. But despite all that, we have not managed to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to protect itself from the constant air attacks on its civilian and energy infrastructures. The winter is going to be very harsh for Ukrainians, with massive power cuts. Nor have we managed to provide sufficient support to Ukraine, particularly on the ammunition side, to enable it to prevent the Russian army from continuing its advance into Donetsk, let alone take back lost territory. In the autumn, the direct intervention of North Korean soldiers on the Russian side marked a dangerous escalation, and constitutes a very worrying step towards the internationalisation of the conflict.

Russia’s war of aggression is an existential threat to the EU

I have already said it many times: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is an existential threat to the European Union. If Vladimir Putin’s Russia were to win in Ukraine, it would inevitably pursue its imperial policy against other neighbours, particularly in Europe. And we have already seen the effects of this aggressive policy in Georgia and Moldova. Beyond Europe, if we fail to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty, the entire rules-based world order that we have sought to promote globally will be brought down.

Many have been saying over and over again since February 2022 that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was a wake-up call for Europe. But as political scientist Ivan Krastev rightly said a few weeks ago, in a debate in which I took part, there is a difference between being awake and getting out of bed to act. And it seems that many in Europe have certainly been woken up by Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, but have not yet really got out of bed.

Many in Europe have certainly been woken up by Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, but have not yet really got out of bed.

Yet it is all the more urgent to do so now that the commitment of the United States, not only in Ukraine but for Europe’s security as a whole, has become more uncertain for the future with the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House. We have no choice: it is imperative that we become capable of ensuring our own security. Our well-being and future cannot continue to depend on the mood of US voters in the Midwest every four years. This means, in particular, revitalising our defence industries, which have been greatly weakened by 30 years of "silent disarmament" since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Our defence budgets have already increased significantly in recent years, particularly our spending on equipment, which has risen by one-third since 2022. Nevertheless, despite Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, progress has been slow to date in coordinating our supplies of military equipment: only 18 % of our purchases are currently made in a cooperative manner, whereas several years ago, we had already set ourselves a target of 35 % – twice as much. What is more, our defence industry has not been able until now to keep pace with our rearmament effort, either quantitatively or qualitatively: since 2022, almost 80 % of additional military equipment has been purchased outside the EU.

Consolidating and boosting our defence industries

If we want to be able to replenish the stocks of our armed forces, support Ukraine at the necessary level, reduce our excessive external dependence and prepare for the future by developing the defence equipment of tomorrow, we urgently need to boost our defence industries.

Since 2022, we have already doubled our artillery ammunition production capacity, thanks in particular to the efforts of my colleague Commissioner Thierry Breton, but we still need to do more in this sector and duplicate this effort in others. We have a quantitative but also a qualitative problem in many domains that will be decisive for the future, like artificial intelligence and drones.

That is why, in spring 2024, we prepared and presented, with the European Commission, the first-ever European defence industry strategy. But we still need to find the means to implement it. The Draghi report puts the effort required at €500 billion over the next 10 years. To mobilise these resources, we first need to remove the existing obstacles to private financing of defence industries and enable the European Investment Bank to provide greater support for defence projects. But this will not be enough: significant amounts of European public money will also be needed.

The existential threat posed to Europe by the aggression of Putin’s Russia would, in my view, clearly justify issuing European common debt to deal with it and support our defence and our defence industry.

Can we wait until 2028 and the next European multiannual financial framework to start supporting our defence industry more substantially than we do today? I do not think so. As we decided in the face of the major emergency represented by the COVID-19 pandemic, the existential threat posed to Europe by the aggression of Putin’s Russia would, in my view, clearly justify issuing European common debt to deal with it and support our defence and our defence industry. I am well aware of how politically sensitive the subject is, but at a time when the US commitment to European security is becoming more and more uncertain, I do not see any possible alternative that is equal to the needs.

In the new Commission, there will be a dedicated Commissioner for Defence. In practice, however, it will be more a Commissioner for the defence industry, which indeed needs better coordination and an active boost. For this effort to be effective, this Commissioner will have to work in close cooperation with the HR/VP, who is in charge of EU security and defence policy. It is indeed essential to coordinate precisely what we do on the demand side of European armies, managed by the HR/VP via the European Defence Agency in particular, and on the supply side, via the specific industrial policy of the Commission.

The contrast between our passivity in the face of events in the Middle East and our strong commitment to supporting Ukraine against the Russian aggression is very often perceived as the expression of a double standard.

Above all, the contrast between our passivity in the face of events in the Middle East and our strong commitment to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, even if it remains insufficient, is very often perceived outside Europe as the expression of a double standard: non-EU citizens often believe that for us the life of a Palestinian child is not worth as much as that of a Ukrainian child. This is obviously not true: the vast majority of Europeans absolutely do not think this way. But the reality of our actions on the one hand and our inaction on the other can give such an impression, which is widely exploited against us by Russian propaganda and disinformation in the countries of what is now known as the Global South. And this does not just concern Muslim countries. I have been struck by the vigour with which this criticism is regularly levelled at us in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa.

We must avoid the consolidation of the "rest against the West"

Europe’s leaders naturally tend to focus mainly on the internal problems facing our economies and societies and the reactions they provoke among Europe’s citizens. And, of course, nobody can blame them for that. But we need to ensure that this does not lead to actions that could damage our relations with the rest of the world. That would be a mortal danger for the future of the European Union.

It is, on the contrary, my job to improve these relations, and I have continued to work relentlessly in that direction throughout this year. Even if the results have not been sufficient at this stage in the Ukrainian conflict or the Middle East, as I have just pointed out, they have been more positive elsewhere in 2024.